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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
MIXED SPATIAL AND NONSPATIAL PROBLEMS IN LOCATION BASED
SERVICES
by
Jaime Ballesteros
Florida International University, 2013
Miami, Florida
Professor Naphtali Rishe, Major Professor
With hundreds of millions of users reporting locations and embracing mobile
technologies, Location Based Services (LBSs) are raising new challenges. In this
dissertation, we address three emerging problems in location services, where ge-
olocation data plays a central role. First, to handle the unprecedented growth of
generated geolocation data, existing location services rely on geospatial database
systems. However, their inability to leverage combined geographical and textual
information in analytical queries (e.g. spatial similarity joins) remains an open
problem. To address this, we introduce SpsJoin, a framework for computing spatial
set-similarity joins. SpsJoin handles combined similarity queries that involve tex-
tual and spatial constraints simultaneously. LBSs use this system to tackle different
types of problems, such as deduplication, geolocation enhancement and record link-
age. We define the spatial set-similarity join problem in a general case and propose
an algorithm for its efficient computation. Our solution utilizes parallel computing
with MapReduce to handle scalability issues in large geospatial databases.
Second, applications that use geolocation data are seldom concerned with en-
suring the privacy of participating users. To motivate participation and address
privacy concerns, we propose iSafe, a privacy preserving algorithm for computing
safety snapshots of co-located mobile devices as well as geosocial network users.
vi
iSafe combines geolocation data extracted from crime datasets and geosocial net-
works such as Yelp. In order to enhance iSafe’s ability to compute safety recommen-
dations, even when crime information is incomplete or sparse, we need to identify
relationships between Yelp venues and crime indices at their locations. To achieve
this, we use SpsJoin on two datasets (Yelp venues and geolocated businesses) to
find venues that have not been reviewed and to further compute the crime indices
of their locations. Our results show a statistically significant dependence between
location crime indices and Yelp features.
Third, review centered LBSs (e.g., Yelp) are increasingly becoming targets of
malicious campaigns that aim to bias the public image of represented businesses.
Although Yelp actively attempts to detect and filter fraudulent reviews, our ex-
periments showed that Yelp is still vulnerable. Fraudulent LBS information also
impacts the ability of iSafe to provide correct safety values. We take steps toward
addressing this problem by proposing SpiDeR, an algorithm that takes advantage of
the richness of information available in Yelp to detect abnormal review patterns. We
propose a fake venue detection solution that applies SpsJoin on Yelp and U.S. hous-
ing datasets. We validate the proposed solutions using ground truth data extracted
by our experiments and reviews filtered by Yelp.
vii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
The popularity of Location Based Services (LBSs), in particular Geosocial Networks
(GSNs), has grown at unprecendented levels as they embrace mobile technology
for user interaction and geolocation capabilities. According to [Zic12], the overall
proportion of American adults that use location based services has almost doubled
from 2011 to 2012 and billions of geographic locations have been generated through
GSNs [ASE13]. By hosting millions of users and generating overwhelming amounts
of geographic data, LBSs have raised new challenges at different levels. In this
dissertation, we identify three problems found in LBSs that deal with spatial and
nonspatial data. First, we address the problem of ensuring accuracy in geolocation
data. Second, we tackle privacy issues in LBSs in a safety-awareness application.
Third, we address correctness of data in review based LBSs. Given that geolocation
data contain spatial and nonspatial attributes, we argue that combining both types
of attributes into mixed techniques provides robust and effective solutions for these
three aforementioned problems.
In order to understand our motivation, we describe the problems below and we
briefly explain why current solutions do not work.
• Ensuring Data Accuracy. In order to ensure effective service, an LBS
provider needs to supply accurate location data. To this end, the LBS provider
relies on spatial database systems that offer different types of queries (e.g. find
the nearest hotel to a given location). However, since geolocation data come
from different sources, the accuracy might be very low and it may affect trust
and confidence of users e.g. an inaccurate query, when the a user tries to
1
find a home, might result in a high crime area. One way to improve the
accuracy of the location data in a given geographic dataset is to leverage
another, more accurate, geographic dataset, and find the corresponding real
world entities in the more accurate one. This requires a database join operation
that finds similar pairs from one or more geographic datasets. Given that
geographic datasets in LBSs contain both location and textual data, one may
use either similarity joins or spatial joins. In a similarity join [AGK, XWLY,
BMS07, VCL10], records are matched based on their textual component only
if they satisfy a similarity threshold. This join operation is commonly used
for duplication detection, knowledge discovery and record linkage. In a spatial
join [JS], records are matched based on their spatial component e.g. geographic
coordinates, polygons, etc. The join constraint may be polygon overlap or
closeness between points using a distance function.
However, direct application of any these joins are likely to fail. For instance,
finding a pair of similar records in two geographic datasets requires the textual
attributes to be similar and the location of records to be close: a match for
“John Doe” in Miami cannot be “John Doe” in New York. In this case, a simi-
larity join would match both “John Doe”s, ignoring completely the geographic
information. On the other hand, a spatial join using a distance function con-
straint, would match “John Doe” in Miami with its nearest records in Miami,
but not necessarily another “John Doe” since it ignores the textual attribute
of the data.
Therefore, a join operation that leverages both types of attributes seems more
appropiate for finding real world entities in geographic datasets. Furthermore,
since this operation requires the combination of large geographic datasets, an
efficient and scalable solution that leverages parallel computing is essential,
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specially with the ever increasing costs of Infrastructure As A Service (IAAS)
environments [AWS].
• Ensuring Privacy In Safety Awareness Applications. LBSs, in particu-
lar GSNs, have attractive features and support mobile capabilities that allow
users to share locations and interact [New12]. Specifically, a system where
users are seamlessly made aware of their safety in a personalized and private
manner can be used to address an important issue that impacts people’s lives:
their safety.
In order to achieve this, we need to properly understand and define safety.
While safety is naturally location dependent, it is also inherently volatile. It
not only exhibits temporal patterns (e.g., function of the season, day of week
or time of day) but also depends on the current context (e.g., people present,
their profile and behavior). Furthermore, since safety computations require
the use of personal and location data, careless use of the information exposes
users to significant risks, as they may be traced or spotted in places that they
do not wish to reveal.
Attempts to make people safety-aware include the use of social media as a
means to distribute information about unreported crimes [FAdO+10], or web
based applications for visualizing unsafe areas [Cri, Gua]. However, these
solutions do not model safety and they are unable to integrate its use in the
everyday life of people. Furthermore, these solutions do not handle impor-
tant problems found in LBSs: dealing with inaccurate location data and fake
information that greatly impact the ultimate goal of the applications.
• Ensuring Data Correctness. Review centered LBSs such as Yelp [Yel] and
to some extent TripAdvisor [Tri], host tens of millions of reviews and attract
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tens of millions of monthly visitors [Lyn11, Coc11]. Even though the review
writing process is not rewarded financially, there exists a direct relationship
between reviews and financial gain: Anderson and Magruber [AM12] show that
in Yelp, an extra half-star rating causes restaurants to sell out 19 percentage
points (49%) more frequently. Thus, the popularity and impact of these LBSs
makes malicious behavior, in the form of fraudulent reviews, a threat not only
to their credibility but also to the quality of life of their users.
Although previous work on TripAdvisor [YG09, OCCH11] and fake review
detection in Amazon [JL08, JLL10, LNJ+10, MLG12] have shown promising
results, they cannot be applied directly to Yelp as both, TripAdvisor and Ama-
zon lack geographic location and social networking information. Furthermore,
from the Online Social Networks (OSN) perspective, “sybil” and “spam” de-
tection have been studied, but again these solutions cannot be directly used in
GSNs since their initial conditions may not hold e.g. dealing with geolocation
data. Therefore, ensuring data correctness in review centered LBSs implies
detecting and filtering fake review information, as they have direct impact not
only in the LBS business but also in other dependent applications that rely
on the data, e.g. safety awareness applications.
1.2 Research Approach
With this motivation in mind, and given that geographic data is the central part of
LBSs and GSNs, this dissertation addresses the aforementioned problems at three
different levels.
First, to ensure data accuracy, we argue that the heterogeneity of the attributes
(spatial and nonspatial) of the data used in LBSs (GSNs) has properties that can be
leveraged to improve data preprocessing. We explore techniques that use the com-
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bination of spatial and nonspatial data in order to solve a very important problem
that has received much less attention: the spatial set-similarity join. We develop
similarity measurements that model the degree of similarity between objects in a
geospatial database. Our techniques involve hybrid textual and spatial data struc-
tures that allow our algorithms to prune unnecessary search paths. Furthermore,
we use parallel algorithms to tackle the scalability problems when handling large
databases of geospatial data.
Second, to address privacy concerns found in LBSs, We introduce iSafe, a plat-
form that enables participating users to gauge their safety in real time. We believe
that there exist relations between the crime level at a location and the quality and
quantity of GSN information at that location. We explore this hypothesis using
statistical tests, e.g., the χ2 test. In order to address privacy concerns, iSafe em-
ploys a distributed algorithm to compute safety values in a private manner without
compromising safety user data. Our techniques use secret sharing in a participatory
sensing platform.
Finally, to ensure data correcness, we propose to detect fraudulent information
in review based GSNs. We explore a combination of statistical tools (e.g., outlier
detection) to identify abnormal review behaviors. We focus our work in fake review
campaigns that seem to affect the immediate impact on venues registered in LBSs
such as Yelp. By using Yelp data, we observed interesting behavior specific of Yelp
(e.g. Yelp Events) and we studied the long and short term impact on venues as well.
1.3 Main Contributions
In this section, we state our main contributions for each of the problems that we
tackle in this dissertation. We outline each problem and propose methods for vali-
dating our results.
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1. Supporting Spatial Set-Similarity Joins in Location Base Services
[BCR11]
This contribution presents SpsJoin (Spatial Set-Similarity Join), a framework
that allows users to perform spatial set-similarity joins efficiently on large
geospatial datasets.
• We propose a combined similarity-based approach to solve the Spatial
Similarity Join problem.
• We developed an algorithm that leverages the MapReduce parallel pro-
gramming model to handle large amounts of geographical data, tackling
the scalability problem.
• We implemented the SpsJoin system, a platform for performing and ana-
lyzing results of spatial set-similarity joins on large geographical datasets.
• We validate our results from two different perspectives: efficiency and
precision of the matches found.
2. Towards Privacy Preserving Location Based Service Applications,
the Safe Cities Case [BRCR12, BCR+13]
This contribution presents iSafe, a privacy preserving algorithm for computing
safety snapshots of co-located mobile device as well as geosocial network users.
We developed iSafe in the context of Safe Cities.
• We propose novel approaches to defining location and user based safety
metrics.
• We propose metrics to make users of LBSs safety aware of their surround-
ings and provide a platform to motivate our approach.
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• We investigate the relationships between crime indices at different lo-
cations and the different features in GSNs e.g. rating and number of
reviews.
• We evaluate iSafe using crime and census data from the Miami-Dade
(FL) county as well as data we collected from Yelp, a popular geosocial
network.
3. Filtering Fake Information in Location Based Services [BCRR13,
BRC+13]
This contribution presents mechanisms that detect review campaigns in LBSs
by identifying spikes generated by low rated reviewers. Our approach takes
into account different features in the data, using outlier detection methods.
We also study the impact of Yelp Events in the rating of the venues, either
immediate or over long periods of time.
• We introduce SpiDeR, an algorithm that detects review campaigns by
identifying spikes generated by low rated reviewers. We implemented
SpiDeR as a framework that can be extended to use other machine learn-
ing approaches.
• We collected over a million reviews from Yelp using our own crawler
mechanism. SpiDeR shows that spikes generated by low rated reviewers
are frequent: we have identified hundreds of venues likely to have been
the target of review campaigns.
• We have discovered an unexpected type of review campaign: Yelp events,
organized by Yelp. Yelp events are hosted by a venue and are attended
only by Elite yelpers, whose reviews have a higher impact on the image
of the venue.
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• We implemented WatchYT, a system that extends Yelp with the SpiDeR
functionality. WatchYT alerts users when browsing the Yelp pages of
venues targeted by review campaigns. WatchYT consists of a browser
plugin that collects reviews of venues browsed by users and reports them
to a web server for further processing.
1.4 Outline of the Dissertation
Chapter 2 describes the background and related work in all of our contributions.
Section 2.1 explores related work in spatial set-similarity joins. This section is di-
vided into two subsections devoted specifically to show our investigation in each
of the different types of joins: spatial joins and similarity joins. Section 2.2 shows
related work in Safe Cities. We survey different topics in crime LBS applications,
Smart Cities and participatory sensing techniques. We finish this section with crime
forecasting methods. Section 2.3 shows related work in opinion detection methods
and spam campaign detection. We conclude this section with sybil detection tech-
niques applied in the context of Online Social Networks (OSN).
Chapter 3 describes our first set of contributions in spatial set-similarity joins.
Section 3.2 shows the architecture of our solution. Section 3.3 defines the problem
formally. Section 3.4 extends our initial definition. Section 3.5 shows our improve-
ment over our initial version and present novel metrics to score pairs of relevant
matches.Finally Section 3.6 shows the experimental evaluation of our approach in
terms of performance and precision of our join.
Chapter 4 is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the model considered and
motivates the problem of Safe Cities as an LBS application to compute safety on co-
located users. It also describes the datasets and tools used in this work. Section 4.3
proposes a static, location centric safety labeling technique and Section 4.4 compares
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the ability of existing forecasting tools to predict future crime and safety values.
Section 4.5 introduces the concepts of personalized and context aware safety as well
as the iSafe solution. Section 4.6 investigates relationships between social networks
and crime levels. Section 4.7 describes the iSafe implementation and Section 4.8
presents the evaluation of our results.
Chapter 5 describes our last set of contributions by studying several features of
Yelp. The section is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the system model
as well as statistics of the data we collected from Yelp. Section 5.4.3 shows our
analysis on Yelp Events. Section 5.4 describes our review campaign experiments.
Section 5.3 introduces the notion of user timelines and proposes a user rating def-
inition. Section 5.4 defines venue timelines and presents the SpiDeR algorithm.
Finally, Section 5.5 evaluates the performance of the solutions that we propose.
Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation and summarizes the future work.
9
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter we describe the most relevant literature. We first show existing
approaches on similarity joins and spatial joins that will ultimately serve as our
baseline for spatial set similarity joins. Then, we survey existing work in spatio-
textual query problems and their applications in LBSs. We explore current and
seminal work in LBS applications related to location aware safety which motivates
privacy and participation using GSN providers. Finally, we describe current and
related problems in filtering fake information in GSNs.
2.1 Spatial Set-Similarity Joins
2.1.1 Assumptions
This sections present some assumptions and definitions that we make to better
understand the related work that we present. A geographic database is a database
of objects represented logically by records. Each object contains attributes that
describe its characteristics and they can be numerical, textual and geographic. We
assume that all objects have at least a geographic attribute. A geographic attribute
represents a characteristic that describes the object in the space. For instance,
latitude and longitude coordinates represent the position of the object on Earth.
Another example of geographic characteristic is a polygon. It may represent the
boundaries of the geographic object such as parcels, water bodies, landmarks, etc.
To handle spatial queries efficiently, geographic databases index the data using the
spatial component i.e. the geographic attribute.
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2.1.2 Spatial Joins
Many algorithms have been proposed to tackle the problem of spatial join queries.
In particular, Jacox et.al. [JS] provides an extensive survey on this topic, along with
efficient methods to compute spatial joins in parallel. The main idea of a spatial
join is to combine geographic objects from one dataset with another dataset so
that a spatial constraint is satified. The most common spatial constraint used in
spatial joins is the intersection. For instance, let R be a geographic database of
water bodies and S a geographic database of bridges. The spatial join of R and S
returns the bridges that pass through the water bodies. There are several methods
for computing spatial joins. The most common approach to tackle a spatial join is
to first preprocess the data by approximating the geographic extent of the objects
using Minimum Bounding Rectangles(MBR) [JS]. Figure 2.1 shows examples of
approximations to MBRs. Figure 2.1a shows how to approximate the object with
an MBR in R2. Figure 2.1b shows how such an approximation may waste a lot of
space since the object is significantly smaller than its MBR. Figure 2.1c shows that
in an intersection even though the MBRs intersect, the actual objects might not.
Once the objects are approximated, their MBRs are intersected in a filtering stage.
Then, the set of candidate intersections undergo a refinement stage where the actual
dimensions of the geographical extents of the objects are obtained, and the result
set is built, removing false positives.
There are variations in the way these two stages work. When the objects are not
indexed, algorithms use a nested loop approach [ME92]. These methods work well
when the size of the datasets to be joined is small and they can work in memory.
However, when the datasets are large, a nested loop approach is not recomended,
as it implies a quadratic running time for processing. There are other methods that
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(a) Approximation in R2 (b) Waste of space in ap-
proximation.
(c) No intersection.
Figure 2.1: Minimum Bounding Rectangle approximation.
also work well in memory. The plane sweep approach [APR+98] works similar to a
plane sweep technique in computational geometry in database objects.
As we noted above, objects can be indexed using their spatial component. Samet
et.al. [Sam90] provides a survey of the most important data structures for processing
spatial data using hierarchical structures (e.g. trees). The “flagship” spatial data
structure used in databases is the r-tree [Gut84]. R-trees are balanced multiway
trees that organize spatial objects using their MBRs. The hierarchy is stablished
by MBR overlaping at each of the levels and r-trees are specially suitable to handle
nearest neighbor queries and rectangle overlap. Figure 2.2 shows an example of this
data structure. As we can see, in Figure 2.2a the space is partitioned based on
the rectangles. Note that there may be overlap. Figure 2.2b shows how the data
structure is organized in memory.
R-tree’s maintenance and query processing work similar to B-trees [Com79] as
they keep balance by using node splitting when node overflows occur. Also, r-trees
are suitable for database management since they can keep actual spatial objects in
disk while a node manager is in charge of the memory management using a hash
table in memory to map memory-disk allocations.
R-trees have been used extensively for spatial joins. Huang et.al. [HJR97] pro-
pose a method for computing spatial joins using r-trees with global optimizations.
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Their approach requires both datasets to be indexed in the database management
system. However, there are other methods that do not need the datasets to be
indexed. When one dataset is indexed, efficient techniques exist to bulk-load the
unindexed dataset and perform a regular spatial join using r-trees. The main ad-
vantage is that the index of previously unindexed dataset is now a by-product of
the process and can be used for further query processing. However, when there is
no need for keeping an index, Lo et.al [LR94] propose spatial joins using seed trees.
R1  
R2 
 R3  
 R5 
 R6
 R7
 R8
 R9
 R10
 R11
 R12
 R13
 R14
(a) Spatial partitioning.
R1
R9
R2 R5
R10
R8R7R6R3
R13
R11 R12
R14
(b) Actual structure.
Figure 2.2: R-Tree example.
We emphasize that these methods only take into account the spatial components
of the data. Therefore, they are unlikely to be used for computing Spsjoin queries.
However, we adapted spatial parallel processing techniques [PD96], to scale our so-
lution in a MapReduce model. Processing large geographical datasets in parallel
using MapReduce have been studied previously in [CSHR09] and [ZHLW09]. Cary
et.al [CSHR09] use a z-order space filing curve approach for partitioning the dataset
into groups based on the spatial attribute. Their solution achieves scalability by
relying on random sampling of a set of points that are sorted based on z-order.
These points define unidimensional intervals(partitions) where points in the dataset
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are mapped. However, if the data is skewed, the claim that z-order generates almost
uniformly-sized partitions is no longer true. Even though in practice, minimal vari-
ations in sizes of the partitions are acceptable, for certain datasets this may cause
scalability issues.
2.1.3 Set Similarity Joins
Set similarity join queries have been widely studied in [AGK], [XWLY], [BMS07]
and [KS98]. Arasu et. al. [AGK] propose efficient methods for computing similarity
joins using filtering techniques based on threshold. This work derived interesting re-
sults that were later leveraged in [BMS07] and [XWLY] to describe new applications
for near duplicate detection of web pages and documents in the web. A similarity
join requires a similarity metric that measures the relatedness of the objects being
considered. The general constraint that defines a similarity metric is given in Equa-
tion 2.1. This constraint stablishes that all pairs of objects (r, s) whose similarity
measurement is greater than or equal to τ should be part of the join.
sim(r, s) ≥ τ (2.1)
Tan et.al [TSK05b] present popular similarity metrics used in data mining, spe-
cially when working in clustering algorithms. Jaccard coefficient, cosine similarity
and overlap similarity are used mostly in set-similarity joins. The idea is to take the
attribute or set of attributes that the user deems as descriptors of the objects and
create sets for further comparison. For instance, let r be an object that consists of
a textual attribute such as its name “John Doe”. This name may be transformed
into a set in two different ways: by tokenizing the string using words or q-grams.
Therefore, in the words case, “John Doe” is the set {“John′′, “Doe′′}, where as in
the 3-grams case, the set is {“Joh′′, “ohn′′, “hn′′, “nD′′, “Do′′, “Doe′′}.
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While current techniques on similarity joins are extremely powerful to prune
candidate pairs with low similarity, they work well only for large values of thresholds,
e.g. 0.9 or 0.8. For medium threshold values, the running time degenerates to
quadratic computation and other techniques that rely on Locality Sensitive Hashing
(LSH) are employed [AI08], under probabilistic guarantees. LSH techniques are also
used when the dimensionality of the data is too large. This is true specially when
objects are transformed into large sets of elements that need similarity computations
very fast.
All of these methods work well in main memory, being ppjoin the fastest algo-
rithm, using a suite of filtering strategies to prune candidates that may not satisfy
the similarity threshold. However, with the explosion of the data, in-memory sim-
ilarity joins are not suitable as they may experience scalability problems. Vernica
et. al. [VCL10] propose scalable techniques for joining datasets using MapReduce.
Their work rely on mapping of records using the prefix of the textual attributes
under a global ordering. Then, in the reducers the algorithm perform local joins
using either nested loop approach or ppjoin, proposed in xiao:www.
2.1.4 Spatio-Textual Queries
LBSs have adapted spatial and textual techniques to answer specialized queries
that involve both, spatial and textual information. The main advantage here is
that, when the spatial component has been already used to prune unnecessary data,
the textual component helps further to prune data and a much more efficient hybrid
algorithm results. However, this approach has a cost: it requeries storing of addi-
tional data by augmenting the data structures. It also poses additional scalability
problems when the size of the data is extremely large.
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The work of Hariharan et.al [HHLM07] shows how to build hybrid r-trees with
augmented textual data at node level. However, their solution suffers from a phe-
nomenon called the “keyword spread” problem. They propose handling the issue
by collapsing pages of nodes with the same keyword at the same level, but it is not
clear from the paper how this actually works. Alsubaiee et. al. [ABL10] provide
a detailed description of a hybrid index for answering approximate spatio-textual
queries. Their solution use inverted indexes at different levels of an r-tree, depending
on cost functions that yield effective pruning depending on the spatial distribution
of the data e.g. for sparse areas, spatial pruning is more effective than keyword
prunning at high levels of the tree. However, even though this work claims that this
type of index is space efficient, pathological cases may lead to the keyword spread
problem as well. Also, they do not seem to apply space efficient filtering techniques
as proposed by [XWLY].
2.2 Location Based Services Applications: Safe Cities Approach
LBS applications rely on geolocation data to provide services. This dissertation
studies Safe Cities as a platform to motivate and to address privacy concerns found
in LBSs. To this end, in this Section we studied related work in Smart Cities
which are technological platforms in cities to reduce expenditures. We explore all
related work that we use in our research, from machine learning techniques and
crime prediction methods, to participatory sensing.
2.2.1 Safe Cities
Smart cities have been the focus of recent efforts at IBM [IBM] and several academic
research groups at MIT [Lab] and UCLA [UCL]. Caragliu et. al. [CDBN09] present
16
a study on the factors that determine the performance of a “smart city”. They
focus specifically on European cities by analyzing urban environments, levels of
education and different accessibility modalities that are positively correlated with
urban wealth. Since one important aspect of smart cities is safety, Patton [Pat10]
emphasizes the use of audio sensors and cameras that allow authorities to quickly
respond in an emergency event without receiving a 911 call. We note that we
consider a different angle: making users aware of their surroundings.
Furtado et. al. [FAdO+10] propose the use of social media in a collaborative
effort to inform people about crime events that are not reported to police. Their wiki
website spots areas on the map where participant users have reported crime events.
Police departments also release tools to make citizens aware of their safety, e.g., the
Miami-Dade police department, deployed an web application [Dep] that identifies
crime areas based on current crime reports. We note however that our solution
seamlessly integrates context and time sensitive safety metrics into the everyday
user experience.
2.2.2 Participatory Sensing
Participatory sensing is receiving increasing attention due to the popularity of mo-
bile devices. The multimodal sensing capabilities of devices enable a broad range
of applications that leverage collected data from participants, sensed from their
surroundings. Estrin [Est10] discuss advantages of participatory sensing in health
and transportation and provide insights on the architecture of participatory sensing
applications. Thiagarajan et. al. [TBGE10] propose cooperative transit tracking
using mobile phones. Privacy becomes a serious concern when the user personal
information may be compromised. Christin et. al. [CRKH11] present a survey on
the efforts made to preserve privacy in participatory sensing systems. In contrast,
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our work does not collect user information, but instead allows devices to aggregate
information collected from co-located users without learning personal information.
Dynamic safety practices leveraging social networks and GPS mobile phones have
been introduced in [YBL+08] to create a system for personalized safety awareness.
The system exploits sensors available in mobile phones to enhance the personal safety
of users by aggregating community. Our work is different in that we predict future
crime levels, define a safety index that includes the impact of crimes on locations and
on the profiles of users and propose a distributed algorithm that privately aggregates
safety indexes of co-located users.
2.2.3 Crime Prediction
The problem of crime prediction has been explored in several contexts. Hotspot
mapping [CTU08] is a popular analytical technique used by law enforcement agen-
cies to identify future patterns in concentrated crime areas. Different methods and
techniques have been analyzed to review the utility of hotspot mapping in [ECC+05],
[CR05], [Jef99], [CRS02]. Hot spot analysis however, often lacks a systematic ap-
proach, as it depends on human intuition and visual inspection.
A variety of univariate and multivariate methods have been used to predict crime.
Univariate methods range from simple random walk [BSV98] to more sophisticated
models like exponential smoothing. While exponential smoothing offers greater ac-
curacy to forecast ”small to medium-level” changes in crime [GO01], we have shown
that ARIMA and ANN models outperformed it on our data. In [EA07], Ediger et al.
show the effectiveness and reliability of ARIMA and SARIMA models in predicting
the total primary energy demand of Turkey from 2005 to 2020. Olligschlaeger [Oll97]
showed that ANNs were able to predict drug markets. We note that the goal of our
work is not intrinsically crime forecasting. Instead, we incorporate crime forecasting
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techniques into our safety metrics, in an attempt to provide to participating users
a dynamic framework for safety awareness.
2.3 Fake Review Detection and Opinion Spam in Location Based Ser-
vices
Data in LBSs should be correct and consistent since it forms the central part of
the operations in this type of systems. In review-centered LBSs the data come in
the form of reviews with different characteristics, venue or product information and
user profiles if the LBS has GSN capabilities. The correctness of the data implies
that fake information may have a significant impact in LBSs as this may hurt the
credibility and confidence in the use of the system.
In this section, we explore current literature available that tackles opinion and
fake review detection systems. These works rely on different techniques, such as
machine learning and statistical analysis, but also in natural language processing
mechanisms to process text data. We also review some of the web crawling tech-
niques and data collection processes that we use heavily in our research.
Jindal and Liu [JL08] introduced the problem of detecting opinion spam in the
context of product reviews. The techniques proposed in the context of Amazon
reviews, include detecting spam, duplicate or plagiarized reviews and outlier reviews.
Jindal et al. [JLL10] extend this work to identify unusual review patterns which
can represent suspicious behaviors of reviewers. They formulate the problem as
finding unexpected domain independent rules and also test their solution on Amazon
reviews. In the context of review spam, Lim et al. [LNJ+10] propose techniques
that determine a user’s deviation from the behavior of other users reviewing similar
products. Our work complements this research. We focus on reviews written in
geosocial networks, where we further rely on the location of reviewers and reviewed
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venues as well as social dimensions. This allows us to discover new relations and
exploit them to detect not only fake reviews and reviewers but also venues that are
frequent targets of such attacks.
Of notable importance is the work of Ott et al. [OCCH11] who created a database
of fake hotel reviews in TripAdvisor, then integrated work from psychology and
computational linguistics to develop and compare three approaches to detecting
deceptive opinion spam. Unlike this work, which focuses on the text of reviews,
our research relies on social and geographic dimensions to address the same issue in
Yelp: Unlike TripAdvisor, Yelp provides us with access to the location and friends
of reviewers.
Li et al. [LHYZ11] and Ntoulas et al. [NNMF06] rely on the review content to
detect review spam. Li et al. [LHYZ11] exploit machine learning methods in their
product review mining system. Ntoulas et al. [NNMF06] propose several heuristic
methods for detecting content based spam and combine the most effective ones to
improve results. Our work differs through its emphasis on relationship among re-
viewers, friends and ratings in the context of Yelp’s spatial and temporal dimensions.
Mukherjee et al. [MLG12] focus on fake reviewer groups, reviewers who work
collaboratively to write fake reviews. They propose the use of a frequent itemset
mining method to find a set of candidate groups, then used several behavioral models
derived from the collusion phenomenon among fake reviewers and relation models
based on the relationships among groups, individual reviewers, and products they
reviewed to detect fake reviewer groups. We consider a different adversarial model,
where the membership of reviewer groups inherently changes due to the nature of
the recruitment process (i.e., Amazon Mechanical Turks).
Gao et al. [GHW+10] target asynchronous wall messages to detect and charac-
terize spam campaigns. They model each wall post as a pair of text description and
20
URL and apply semantic similarity metrics to identify large subgraphs representing
potential social spam campaigns and later incorporate threshold based techniques
for spam detection. Instead, we focus on temporal and geosocial review context, the
where reviewer activity and behavioral pattern are of significant importance. Feng
et al. [FXGC12] relies on the J-shaped distributions of review ratings received by
most venues to identify venues that receive too many 5 star reviews from single-time
users.
Wang et al. [WXLY11] introduce the concept of heterogeneous review graphs
and iterative methods exploring relationship among reviewers, reviews and stores to
detect spammers. While we also consider social relations among reviewers we differ
on our focus on temporal and spatial dimensions.
2.3.1 Sybil detection
Detecting review campaigns can benefit from existing sybil detection techniques.
Of particular relevance is DSybil, the work of Yu et al. [YSK+09] that applies in
the context of the news voting social network Digg. The semantics of reviews for
venues of Yelp however differ fundamentally from news. Venues change in time, and
reviews are always welcomed in expressing the time fluctuations of a venue’s quality.
In a sense, the performance of a venue each day can be viewed as a “news item”.
Tran et al. [TMLS09] proposed SumUp, a trust based sybil defense mechanism that
uses “adaptive vote flow aggregation” to limit the number of fake feedback provided
by an adversary to the number of attack edges in the trust network - that is, the
number of bi-directional trust edges the attacker is able to establish to other users.
WatchYT can benefit from the techniques of SumUp, or even be used in conjunction
with it. However, we note that previous work [BSBK09, BMBR11] has shown that
Facebook users frequently accept friend invitations from complete strangers.
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2.3.2 Web Crawling and Data Collection Process
In this section we survey the most important research in web crawling techniques.
A web crawler is a system whose main purpose is to bulk-downloading large
amounts of web pages. An interesting survey can be found in [ON10]. This survey
handles efficient techniques, either static or dynamic, to download web pages with
different objectives. The main goal of a web crawler is to produce the collection of
web pages that are indexed by a search engine and therefore, it relies heavily on link
discovery within the web pages crawled. The work of Aggarwal et.al. [AAGY01]
proposes the concept of intelligent crawling which learns characteristics of the link
structure found in web pages. The idea is to use the inlink attributes to determine
the probability that a candidate is useful for crawling. This has tremendous impact
in the performance of the crawler, since repeated web pages cause the crawler to
slow down its execution.
From the theoretical point of view, Baeza-Yates et.al.[BYC07] studied several
probabilistic models that predict how deep users of the internet go while exploring
Web sites. They propose the back one level at a time, back to the first level and back
to any previous level models and compare their results. We note that our crawling
techniques use the one level at a time type of model, since we do not explore explore
more than two hops deep in the Yelp data. In Section 5 we show our web crawler
architecture used to get crawl the data that we leverage in this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 3
SUPPORTING SPATIAL SET-SIMILARITY JOINS IN LOCATION
BASED SERVICES
In this chapter, we present SpsJoin, a framework for computing spatial set-similarity
joins. We first show our motivation through specific applications in LBSs. This
framework is used primarily in our flagship platform Terrafly [FIU] for geolocation
enhancement and knowledge discovery by leveraging the richness of our data reposi-
tory. Then, we define the problem formally as general case where the user is agnostic
of the similarity parameters. Finally, we extend our solution by using a novel con-
tent similarity function that ranks pairs of best matches. We conclude with a set of
experiments that validate our approach using real world datasets.
3.1 Introduction
In modern geographical databases, records contain textual and spatial attributes to
describe characteristics and location of real-world entities. When the location of the
records has low accuracy, e.g. geolocated at the center of the city, their location
may be enhanced by finding their most similar records in another database, known
to have high location precision. For instance, Figure 3.1b shows sample records
of Physicians database, geolocated at city center level precision and Yellow Pages
database with high geolocation precision. Intuitively, the most similar object of
physician “John F. Smith MD” is “John Smith MD” in Yellow Pages, since both
names are very similar and geographically closer. The same is true for a Flickr [FLI]
dataset that might be enhanced by finding similar records in a dataset of Hotels,
as shown in Figure 3.1a. Therefore, finding the most similar pairs between two
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Tags: Delano Hotel Miami 
Beach
Delano Hotel, South 
Beach
(a) Flickr spsjoin Hotels
New York, NY
Miami, FL
John F. Kennedy
Loc: (41.3,-74.3)
John Smith MD
Loc: (25.3,-82.4) John F. Smith MD
Loc: Miami,FL
Yellow Pages
Physicians
Best Match?
(b) Best match for physician “John F. Smith”
Figure 3.1: Applications of an spsjoin operation
geographical databases requires a composite join operation that considers both types
of attributes, textual and spatial.
Such type of join, namely Spatial Set Similarity join, has received much less
attention in the research community than individual joins on either textual or spatial
attributes. In the textual case, the degree of resemblance in a similarity join [AGK,
XWLY] is measured by a similarity function, e.g. Jaccard coefficient or Levenshtein
distance, and pairs that satisfy a user-defined similarity threshold are included in
the output. Recently, parallel processing with MapReduce, a parallel programming
model proposed by Google [DG], has been explored to tackle the scalability problem
of this type of joins [VCL10]. In the spatial case, a spatial join [JS] between two
geographical datasets matches records based on their spatial attributes. The spatial
relation may be expressed in several ways, e.g. distance threshold or polygon overlap.
Direct application of either spatial join or similarity join techniques to solve the
spatial similarity join problem has the disadvantage of potentially generating lots of
pairs that do not satisfy the composite constraint; for example, in Figure 3.1b several
similar physician names and yellow page contact persons may be located far away
from each other, e.g. “John F. Kennedy” in New York, but we are interested only
24
in the geographically nearest pair. Also, when a threshold is predefined for either
similarity or spatial joins, some records may not find their most similar pair when
they do not satisfy the threshold. It is then up to the user to define an appropriate
distance or similarity threshold even when there is no knowledge of the precision
and quality of the data. In addition, as geolocation data is rapidly increasing in
databases, scalability in processing spatial similarity joins is a top concern.
Spatial set-similarity joins have generally the same applications as similarity
joins, including data cleansing and record linkage. In addition to geolocation en-
hancement, this join might be used in disaster management applications, e.g. joining
911 call records with Nationwide cadastre and White Pages databases to pinpoint
massive emergency events. Geolocation enhancement has several implications in
LBS. As we will show in subsequent chapters, the accuracy of the data is of vital
importance for LBS that provide safety of co-located users, as crime index and safety
metrics depend on geolocation data.
3.2 System Architecture
The SpSJoin system is divided into four components. Figu-re 3.2 shows the pro-
posed architecture for our system. The Data Repository stores the geographical
databases used by the system and supports data persistency required by the inter-
acting modules. The Spatial Similarity Join module performs the join and returns
the result set that is indexed by the Query Processing module. Finally, the Data
Visualization module presents an interface to the user for displaying and analyzing
the join results.
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Figure 3.2: SpSJoin System Architecture
3.2.1 Data Repository
The data repository contains several geographic datasets used in different GIS appli-
cations. Data comes from di-fferent sources, including the Internet and public and
private sources, that may or may not need additional geographic location process-
ing. Examples of datasets found in the repository include Hotels, Crime Data,Places
and Landmarks, etc., all of them containing different attributes and geographic lo-
cation. Figure 3.3 shows the Physicians and Yellow Pages datasets with some of
their attributes and spatial location.
Name Suffix Licence Zip Code Location
John F. Smith MD L123 333 (0,1)
J. F. Rose MD M456 444 (-1,0)
R: Physicians - PHY
S: Yellow Pages - YP
Bussiness Title Contact Person Address Location
Jackson Memorial John Smith 231 Park Ave (0,0)
Health Care Corp. Judith F. Rose 9218 Tree Pl (-1,0)
Name Contact Person Jaccard C. distance sim(r,s)
John F. Smith John Smith 0.67 1.0 0.33
John F. Smith Judith F. Rose 0.3 1.0 0.15
J. F. Rose Judith F. Rose 0.67 0.0 0.67
J. F. Rose John Smith 0.0 2.0 0.0
R x S
PHY-YP (Spatial Similarity Join)
Name … Contact Person … sim(r,s)
John F. Smith … John Smith … 0.33
J. F. Rose … Judith F. Rose … 0.67
Best Matched 
Pairsa) Geographic datasets with textual 
and spatial attributes
b) Product R x S and similarity calculations
c) Output of the spatial similarity join
Figure 3.3: Example of a Spatial Similarity Join. Table PHY-YP contains the join
result.
3.3 Spatial Similarity Join
Intuitively, a Spatial Similarity Join finds pairs of objects from two spatial datasets,
a target and a source, in which every pair represents a match of an object in the
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target with the most related object in the source. Relatedness between objects is
modeled with a composite similarity function that combines spatial and textual
attributes. For instance, in Figure 3.3b, the similarity of a pair is calculated by
combining the distance of the objects with their textual similarity on Name attribute
in Physicians and Contact Person in Yellow Pages. The most related pairs from
the Cartesian product are the ones with the highest value given by the similarity,
sim(r, s), function, e.g. 〈“John F. Smith”, “John Smith”〉 and 〈“J.F. Rose”, “Judith
F. Rose”〉. Next, we present the problem statement and describe our approach for
processing spatial similarity joins efficiently.
Notation. We denote our input datasets as R (target) and S (source). Without
loss of generality, records in these datasets are tuples of the form o = 〈a, p〉, where a
denotes a textual attribute and p is a point in the space that denotes the location of
the object o. In practice, objects may contain additional textual attributes, which we
omit to simplify the explanation. MBR refers to the Minimum Bounding Rectangle
that encloses a set of objects. Given two objects r and s, we refer to the function
simt(ar, as) as the textual similarity between attributes ar and as, and dist(pr, ps)
as the distance between points pr and ps. We denote sim(r, s) as the composite
similarity function in the problem statement.
Problem Statement
Given two datasets R and S and a composite similarity function sim(r, s) ∈ [0, 1],
that combines spatial and textual similarity, the problem of Spatial Similarity Join
finds the set of pairs (r, s) ∈ R×S , such that sim(r, s) = max
s′∈S
{sim(r, s′)}. We say
that s is the most related object of r found in S and the pair (r, s) is a best matched
pair.
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Choosing an adequate sim(r, s) function is challenging since each type of at-
tribute has its own semantics and independent similarity values. Therefore, careful
analysis of the datasets is required. For example, if R and S are known to have very
precise spatial attributes, then sim(r, s) may give less importance to the textual
attributes.
3.3.1 Tools
MapReduce
In this work, we use MapReduce [DG] to describe our algorithms. MapReduce is a
popular programming paradigm that leverage distributed computing in commodity
clusters. It is used primarily for data-intensive parallel applications that share no
communication between nodes in the cluster. The data is partitioned and stored in
a distributed file system (DFS). Each partition, called split, is processed in parallel
through map tasks. Figure 3.4 shows how the data flows in a MapReduce job.
The map tasks process and generate lists of key-value pairs (<K,V>) that are later
sorted, merged and grouped by key. These groups of lists become the input of reduce
tasks, i.e. each reducer process a single list of key-value pairs that share the key,
and generate a list of new key-value pairs. This is the final stage of a MapReduce
job.
A popular implementation of the MapReduce model is Hadoop [Apa12], an open
source framework that allows for the distributed processing of large datasets. The
model also defines special functions called combiners. Combiners may help in re-
ducing the amount of data sent through the network by processing the output of
the map tasks in memory before merging and shuﬄing. Similar to reduce tasks,
combiners receive lists of key-value pairs grouped by key and return an aggregation
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of the key-value lists. These aggregations are then merged and grouped by key, so
that reduce tasks can process them. Combiners are useful only when the data can
be aggregated and have the same signatures as reduce tasks and there is no always
a guarantee that they will be executed.
split 1
split 3
split 2
MAP
MAP
MAP
<K1,V1>
<K2,V2>
<K1,V1>
<K3,V3>
<K2,V2>
<K3,V3>
REDUCE
REDUCE
REDUCE
<K1,L1>
<K2,L2>
<K3,L3>
DFS DFS
Figure 3.4: Data flow of a MapReduce job.
3.3.2 Processing Spatial Set Similarity Joins
In our approach, sim(r, s) meets the criterion that similarity of pairs of proximal
objects must be higher than objects located far away from each other. We defined
the following similarity function
sim(r, s) =
simt(ar, as)
1 + dist(pr, ps)
(3.1)
Where simt(ar, as) is a textual similarity function (we used the Jaccard coefficient
in our experiments, simt(ar, as) =
|ar∩as|
|ar∪as|) and dist(pr, ps) is a distance function (we
used Great Circle distance since geographical objects are located with latitude and
longitude). In general, if an object r has two possible matching objects s and s′ with
equal similarity value (i.e. sim(r, s) = sim(r, s′)), the pair with minimum distance
is considered the better pair. In Section 3.4.2 we will define other types of similarity
functions tailored for specific problems in LBS.
When processing spatial similarity joins in large datasets, scalability is a key
challenge. Our algorithm leverages pa-rallel computing with MapReduce, which has
proven its effec-tiveness in large-scale data intensive problems [DG].
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The join process is divided into two main phases: a Spatial Filtering phase and
an Expansion phase. In the Spatial Filtering phase, the entire set of records is par-
titioned w.r.t. their spatial attribute. The rationale is that geographically proximal
object pairs are more likely to generate higher si-milarity values, using Equation 3.1.
In this way, potential best matches are co-located in the same partition, filtering
out pairs with low similarity value whose evaluation is not nece-ssary, e.g. far away
objects do not represent the same real world entity.
Theorem 3.3.1 Let s be a match candidate of record r. The best match sb of record
r can be found within the region limited by er(r, s) =
1
sim(r,s)
− 1
Proof. From Eq. 3.1, the similarity of r and s is sim(r, s). Let sb the best match of
r. Then, the textual similarity of r and sb is given by simt(r, s), which is maximum
when simt(ar, asb) = 1, hence sim(r, s) ≤ 11+dist(pr,psb ) . It follows that dist(pr, psb) ≤
1
sim(r,s)
− 1 = er(r, s).
Since each partition may contain some local best pairs that may have globally
best matches, i.e. with increased similarity value, the Expansion phase gradually
expands the search space of each partition using an upper bound Expansion Region.
Object pairs are reprocessed itera-tively on adjacent geographical regions until their
similarity value cannot be improved anymore, i.e. the best pairs are found, or the
expansion region covers all universe of objects. We illustrate the join execution with
an example, shown in Figure 3.6, that describes the workflow of the process. We
denote clusters of records as Ci, i = {1, 2, 3}, and sets Lji as local output in cluster
Ci at iteration j. Final join output is denoted as L.
Spatial Filtering phase. Figure 3.6 part (I). The Spatial Partitioner compo-
nent is used for partitioning the entire set of records. It is expressed as a MapReduce
job that clusters R ∪ S in parallel using a clustering algorithm; in our experiments,
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Figure 3.5: Dataset clustering. Clusters Ci are formed after Spatial Filtering phase.
we used the X-means clustering technique [PM]. Figure 3.5 shows the spatial layout
of the three clusters in this example: C1, C2 and C3. Note that each Ci is expressed
in Figure 3.6 as Ri ∪ Si.
Expansion phase. Figure 3.6 part (II). Each cluster Ci is processed locally
in parallel using several expansion itera-tions. Each iteration of our example is
described next.
Iteration 1. For each cluster Ci, the Local Joiner component joins Ri and Si
using a nested-loop approach; we implemented the Local Joiner using a modified
version of the fuzzy join proposed in [VCL10], leveraging the MapReduce frame-
work. Mappers tokenize textual attributes from records in Ri ∪ Si and generate
record projections for each token, tagged with the relation name. Reducers receive
records that share the same token, sorted by relation (Si first), and records in Ri are
combined with records in Si. To accelerate the process, records in Si are indexed
using their spatial attibute. For every record in Ri, the spatial index filters records
in Si that will not improve in the combined similarity. The combined similarity is
computed for candidate pairs and the pair with the highest sim(r, s) is kept. The
output of the Local Joiner L1i is the set of local best matched pairs found in cluster
Ci.
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In order to prepare for the next iteration, the input Pi∪ S ′i needs to be calculated.
We observed that each pair (r, s) in L1i defines an internal region, as shown in Figure
3.5, with center pr of r and
The union of all internal regions defines the upper bound Expansion Region for
the cluster, in which objects from Ri may find better matches. Since the Expansion
Region may overlap adjacent clusters, objects in pairs with internal regions that lie
within the cluster’s MBR will not find a better match and the corresponding pairs
are stored in the Bi database as part of the final output. This reduces the size of the
input in the next iteration. With the remaining pairs, objects in Ri are extracted
and stored in Pi, which need further iterations. Finally, the system identifies the
nearest cluster Ck, that overlaps the Expansion region, and stores the overlapping
objects from Sk in S
′
i. In Figure 3.5 for example, the nearest cluster of C1 is C3, so
S ′1 is the set of records from S3 in the shaded region of C3.
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Figure 3.6: Example workflow for SpSJoin.
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Iteration 2. Each Local Joiner receive Ci = Pi∪ S ′i as input and joins Pi and
S ′i as in the previous iteration. Ouput pairs in L2i that improved their similarity
are updated as the new best pair matches. If further clusters need to be explored,
the next nearest cluster that overlaps the Expansion region is identified and S ′i is
computed as above. Else, the local process finishes its execution. In Figure 3.5,
Expansion regions for clusters C2 and C3 do not expand anymore so L
2
2 and L
2
3 are
part of the final output. On the other hand, Expansion region of C1 overlaps C2 so
P1 requires further processing. S
′
1 is now the set of records from S2 in the shaded
region of C2
Iteration 3. Local Joiner is called again with the new input Ci = Pi∪ S ′i and
the output L3i is generated. In our example, the Expansion region for cluster C1 has
no more overlapping clusters to cover, hence set L31 is part of the final output. Since
no clusters need further expansion, the process terminates and the join result set L
is complete. Shaded blocks in Figure 3.6 form the final output of the join.
3.3.3 Query Processing
The Query Processing module , Figure 3.2, is used primarily by the Data Visualizer
component to retrieve records of joined databases (generated by the Spatial Similar-
ity Join module). This module executes spatial queries with non-spatial constraints
posted by users for join quality inspection. Attributes in the join result are first in-
dexed using a hybrid data structure that leverages R-trees and inverted files [CWR]
by the Data Indexer. Second, the Query Processor parses a user query to identify
the query window (geographi-cal region) and (optionally) non-spatial constraints,
and it uses the hybrid index structure to efficiently retrieve records. For instance, in
the join example of Figure 3.3, joined records of physicians with last name “Smith”
and located in “Miami, FL” are displayed in Figure 3.7.
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Details for pair Id: 3048
PHY database
YP database
Ranking score:
Attribute sim.:
Distance:
PHY record:
YP record:
0.33
0.67
1.0
<"John F. Smith", (0,1)>
<"Smith, John", (0,0)>
Figure 3.7: Data visualization of joined records.
3.3.4 Data Visualization
The Data Visualization module displays the results of spatial similarity joins on a
map. Figure 3.7 shows the general user interface of the system. Aerial and satellite
imagery as well as user interface widgets are provided by the TerraFly system1 via
its public API.
When the user selects a location to visualize, the currently displayed map por-
tion determines the query window that will be submitted to the Query Processing
module. Then, users pick a previously joined database from a database drop-down
list to visualize its records. Optionally, users can include keywords in the query
to locate specific objects for inspection. Records that match the query criteria are
displayed as pairs, visually distinguished by circles and diamonds, united by lines
and enclosed in rectangles. Users can click on individual object icons to display
detailed information about the pair the object participates on.
1http://terrafly.fiu.edu
34
Table 3.1: Geographical databases of Physicians (PHY) and Yellow Pages (YP)
used in experiments.
Joining Attributes
Database Records Textual Spatial
PHY 2 millions name zip
YP 20 millions contact person location
3.3.5 Framework Demonstration
We demonstrate our system as follows. First, two real geographical databases, Physi-
cians (target) and Ye-llow Pages (source), were joined with the SpSJoin operator.
The database sizes and joining attributes are shown in Table 3.1. Objects in the
databases represent real-world entities located in the United States. For example,
YP entries include medical professionals of various specialities, which are expected
to match with records in PHY. Jaccard coefficient and Great Circle distance were
used to compute the similarity of textual and spatial attributes, res-pectively. The
data was provided by the HPDRC laboratory2. Second, joined records were stored
in a third database PHY-YP inside our Data Repository, and its attributes were
indexed by the Data Indexer component. The use case demonstrates the improve-
ment of geolocation precision in the Physicians database with matching objects in
the Yellow Pages database; initially, records in PHY were geolocated to the center
of their ZIP codes.
During the demonstration, users will have the opportunity to interact with the
system by visualizing the joined data in the PHY-YP database as shown in Fig-
ure 3.7.
2http://hpdrc.fiu.edu
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3.4 Extending SpsJoin
In the previous sections we have shown our framework implementation of SpsJoin
and the interaction of its components in the architecture. Our definition relies on
a similarity function that combines textual and spatial attributes and measures the
degree of relatedness. Although the algorithm guarantees that the whole universe
of records is not searched when looking for a good match, a large number of pairs
may be of no use.
Following the approach of a set-similarity join, we define a set of parameters
that allow our new SpsJoin to be fine-tune for tailored LBS applications. We take
advantage of the frequency of tokens in geographic locations and rank pairs based
on a novel score function. We also involve accuracy radius in the similarity compu-
tation, since it will help in finding correct matches. We evaluate our solution using
a ground truth built with a pre-computed join that allow us to experiment with
different parameters. We also experimented with large real world datasets to show
the viability and accuracy of our solution.
3.4.1 Returning Relevant Pairs
By definition, the result set of a spatial set-similarity join is a set of pairs. However,
pairs returned by a spatial similarity join might not be appropiate matches. How
certain are we that the pair of objects we are matching are correct? State of the art
suggests the use of set similarity functions that match records naively, as long as a
similarity threshold is satisfied. Our work tries to improve this definition by merging
textual simlarities with geographic distances. However, we have not fully exploited
even more characteristics of the geographical data that may help in identifying truly
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matches, or at least to give a more precise definition of the quality of the pairs being
matched.
In this sense, if one tries to find the match of record a r in dataset S, there are
some interesting observations. We measure the uncertainty of location of any object
by defining a accuracy radius. This radius may be large when the measurement of
location of the object was done with imprecise tools, or when the location of the
object was recorded with noise. For instance, in the Physicians (PHY) database, the
location of the objects contains information only of the zip code where they belong.
In this case, the accuracy radii of the physicians are enclosed in their respective zip
codes. On the other hand, photos from Flickr may have a small accuracy radius, if
a GPS device was used to geo-tag them. The following sections elaborate more on
these ideas.
3.4.2 Selecting the Best Match
In Section 3.3.2 we define a combined similarity function that satisfies our initial
requirement: objects that are closer in distance and whose textual similarity is
larger, will, overall, have a larger composite similarity value. However, the problem
statement in Section 3.3 specifies that matched records will be sorted based on the
value of the similarity function and only the top one will be part of the join result
set. Although from the user’s point of view this approach is very convinient, since
user does not have to specify a similarity threshold, it is very likely to find a large set
of pairs that are false positives. This is true especially for datasets whose relatedness
is very low. For instance, let r be a record in a white pages dataset (WP ) and let
s be a record in hotels dataset (H). Clearly, a SpsJoin result set between WP and
H will likely have a lot of false positives since r and s may share one single token
and yet be close enough that the similarity function will be maximum.
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A similarity threshold may be used in this case, but now it is up to the user
to have clear understanding on how to define it. A fine tune process is required.
However, other issues are raised when a similarity threshold is used. Let us consider
selecting an independent threshold per type of attribute and let John Smith Lex in
R dataset and John Smith and John Lex in S dataset, all in Miami. First of all, a
set-similarity threshold of 0.9 will miss both of them in S. A much smaller threshold
will get too many false positives, many of them with a closer similarity value. Let us
consider now the case of the spatial attributes. A distance threshold indeed works
but one might be missing important matches if the distance threshold is not large
enough. This is the case of a physician geolocated at a certain zip code. If the user
specifies a short search radius, it might not find the true match.
For certain problems, such as deduplication or recommendation systems, finding
the best match is not of paramount importance. As noted in [BGM12], finding
pairs that satisfy a threshold may be enough for these tasks. However, in this
work we are interested in extracting knowledge from the best match. Geolocation
enhancement is one of those applications, as we are interested in extracting the
geographic coordinates of the best match. Our overaching goal is to be able to
rank matches so that our search returns useful candidates. Our approach, on the
other hand, returns matches that we are almost certain. This notion of certainty is
measured using a similarity function.
Figure 3.8 shows an example of a geolocation enhancement of records in R. Each
record has an uncertainty radius, which is the circular region surrounding each point
displayed in the figure. We are interested in finding the best match for record r1,
“John C” and we set our textual similarity threshold to 0.3. The set of candidates
is composed of the records s1, s2 and s3.
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Threshold=0.3
r1: John C
s2: John C
s1:John D
s3: John C
R
S
Best Match
Figure 3.8: Candidates for record r1 “John C”. Best match is s3
Notice that all three records satisfy the textual threshold of 0.3. If we further set
another threshold for the distance, meaning that records that are outside a certain
radius will be pruned, we have a clear winner: record s2. However, s3 is actually a
bad choice for the best match. The reason is that its uncertainty radius is too large.
This means that it can be located at any place within that range. Record s3, on
the other hand has a smaller uncertanty radius, it is more accurate and it is more
likely that this record is the best match. Therefore, the uncertainty radius has to
be taken into account in the similarity computation.
3.4.3 Geographic Inverse Record Frequency
When matched pairs have been computed, a similarity function measures the degree
of relatedness between the matched objects. Similarity functions (e.g. Jaccard
coefficient, cosine similarity) do not exploit the richness in content that low frequency
terms provide to the overall similarity measurement. In geographical datasets, the
frequency of the terms is dominated by the geography where they belong. For
instance, demographic areas provide a clear distinction when it comes to names
found in the population. In hispanic/latino areas in the U.S., “Maria” is a very
popular name. However, it is not the case in places where population is mostly
english speaking. Therefore, in mostly english speaking areas, “Maria” provides
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more information about the certainty of relatedness of the match than in mostly
spanish speaking areas.
To leverage this intuition, we incorporate a term content weight into the simi-
larity funtion. Inspired in the inverse document frequency (idf) measurement from
information retrieval theory [MRS08], we define the Geographic inverse record fre-
quency, Girft, of a term t within geography G as shown in Equation 3.2. We denote
n the number of records within G and m the number of records that contain the
term t in their textual attributes. If t is not within G, Girft is undefined.
Girft(G) = logn(
n
m
) (3.2)
Thus, the Girf of a rare term is high, whereas the Girf of a frequent term is
likely to be low, depending on the geography where they have been measured. To
see this effect, we extracted and tokenized the names in the contact person field in
the Yellow Pages (YP) dataset from two different geographies: Miami, Florida and
Anchorage, Alaska. The number of extracted records in Miami is 92071 and the
number of extracted records in Anchorage is 10854. Figure 3.9a shows Girf of the
top 10 more frequent terms in Miami whereas Figure 3.9b shows the Girf of the
same terms in Anchorage. For instance, term jose in Miami is very popular, so a
set of candidates that contains the term jose may be large and therefore, it does
not carry a distinguishable feature for any of the candidates in order to stand out
as a good match. However, in Anchorage, jose is quite infrequent and therefore a
candidate match that contains the term is likely to be more relevant than any other
candidate with a similar set of matching terms.
Another important observation is that the Girft value of t in a given geography G
is maximum w.r.t geographies contained in G. Thus, for a given geography Gi ⊂ G,
Girft(G) ≥ Girft(Gi).
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(a) Miami, 92071 records.
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Figure 3.9: Girft values for the top ten terms found in Miami
3.4.4 Incorporating Girf Values Into the Content Similarity
As shown in the Section 3.4.3, Girf values can be used to score a term in a textual
attribute. The question of how to incorporate this into the textual similarity function
(from now on called content similarity function) has the folowing rationale. We need
to keep the content similarity bounded. Therefore, we quantify the contribution of
each term in a weighting function that decreases the content similarity if the average
of the Girf values is small. When this average is large, the true similarity remains
intact so attaining maximum value of 1 is desirable. To achieve this, we use the
following weighting function.
CW (ar, as) =
1
(2−Gft(G)) (3.3)
Where Gft(G) is the average of all Girft(G) within geography G provided that
t ∈ ar ∪ as.
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3.4.5 Definitions
This section presents important definitions and parameters that SpsJoin receives to
perform fuzzy joins.
• Candidate. A record s is a matching candidate for record r if the accuracy
radius of s overlaps the accuracy radius of r and they share at least one
token(term) in the textual attribute.
• Radius. It is constant that defines a circle around the point coordinates of
the record such that there is a high confidence that the object lies entirely
within this circle. It is also called the accuracy radius.
• Default Radius. It is a dataset dependent radius that expresses the default
accuracy radius of the objects in the dataset. In other words, it is the smallest
accuracy radius that an object can achieve in the current dataset. For instance,
if we know that Yellow pages has many objects with rooftop level accuracy,
we may assign a 30 meters default radius for matching.
• Geography. It is a geographical extent that encompases an area that may or
may not contain records of a predefined dataset.
• Padded Radius of record r It is the radius of the record plus a constant δ
specific to a particular join run.
3.4.6 Incorporating Uncertainty Regions
When working with geographic datasets, it is important to understand the differ-
ence between the concepts of accuracy and precision of geographic attributes, e.g.
geographic coordinates. Indeed, the location of the objects in the dataset have been
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measured using either GPS devices, geocoder engines, or any other device that pro-
duces geographic coordinates e.g. cellphone triangulation, Wi-Fi based positioning
systems, etc. In particular, GPS devices rely on satellites to compute the location of
users by comparing distances from the subject and the time the signal takes to reach
the GPS receiver. This computation is affected by several factors, e.g. atmospheric,
noise, etc. that affects the accuracy of the measurement. Therefore, they can only
guarantee an accuracy within a certain radius on average. Similarly, geocoder en-
gines translate strings (home addresses) into geographic coordinates. The geocoder
strives to geolocate the given string using a database of streets. When the address
matches exactly, the geocoder simply returns the corresponding coordinates. Since
perfect match is not always the case, as the string may contain typos, or the streets
database does not have all information, the geocoder interpolates the given address
using approximate locations that are partially extracted from the address, e.g. city,
street, state, etc. and returns the geographic coordinates along with an accuracy
level (accuracy radius). We define the accuracy as the tendency of the measurements
to agree with the true values. It is measured using an uncertainty region, that is a
closed region where there is a guarantee that the true location of the object may
lie. On the other hand, precision is the degree to which the measurement pin down
an actual value. In general, there is no need for much more precision in the mea-
surement than there is accuracy built into it. In fact, using too much precision may
mislead users of a system into believing that the accuracy is greater than it really is.
In our model, we encode the uncertainty region using the radius of the circunference
that encloses the uncertainty region. Given an object r in a geographic dataset, we
denote rrad as the lenght of the radius that defines uncertainty region. We will refer
rrad as the accuracy radius. Equation 3.4 defines a piecewise function that penalizes
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the degree of the quality of a pair, based on the uncertainty region of each object
and their dataset dependent default radius.
RW (r, s) =

dist(r,s)+rad(r)+rad(s)
def(R)+def(S)
if not fully contained
rad(r)+rad(s)
def(R)+def(S)
otherwise.
(3.4)
Hence, when one of the objects is fully contained within the uncertainty region
of the other, the distance between both is zero. Therefore, the first part of RW
is used as region weight. When uncertainty regions overlap, the distance between
objects is considered important, since the best pair is likely to be the closest one. In
order to know when two regions overlap, the inequality dist(r, s) ≤ rad(r) + rad(s)
has to be satisfied.
3.4.7 Putting it All Together
We incorporate CW from Equation 3.3 and RW from Equation 3.4 weights into our
combined similarity measurement. Equation 3.5 shows the transformed similarity
function simw after we plug in the weights.
simw(r, s) =
tsim(ar, as) ∗ CW (ar, as)
1 +RW (r, s)
(3.5)
Note that simw is still bounded but it does not reach 1 when both, r and s, are
the same. The reason is that there are no precise objects in the real world. There
is always an uncertainty region and the weights of the Equation are intended for
reflecting this.
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3.4.8 Incorporating Uncertainty: Entropy
It is a measure of unpredictability in a random variable [CT91, TSK05b]. The best
example used to explain it is to consider the toss of a coin. When one toss a fair
coin, the probability of obtaining heads or tails is equal to 0.5. Therefore, it is hard
to predict what would be the result of the next coin toss. However, if the coin has
two heads and no tails, we are “certain” on what the next outcome will be. In this
case, the entropy tells us that the unfair coin gave us more information than the
fair coin, in order to predict the outcome.
Let X be a random variable. The entropy H is defined as shown in Equation 3.6:
H =
∑
i
p(xi) log p(xi) (3.6)
We leverage this concept to measure the uncertainty of selecting a best matching
pair. Given a set of possible candidates, we group them into buckets of similarities.
For our purposes, we use only 5 buckets (clusters). We cluster the data using a
one-dimensional k-means algorithm which partitions the data optimally. The mean
of each bucket is the representative similarity value of the bucket. Then, we measure
the entropy of the cluster. If the entropy is large (close to one when normalized) we
know that we cannot make a decision, since we are uncertain on which candidate
pair to pick. On the other hand, if the entropy is low (close to zero), then we
are more certain that we can pick a candidate pair. We will see later how to pick
the uncertainty threshold to reject or to accept a candidate pair by combining this
measure with the similarity value.
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3.5 Improving SpsJoins
Maintaining scalability is an issue of paramount importance when working with large
datasets in parallel. We express our algorithms using the MapReduce programming
model for two main reasons. First, the framework provides all the functionality of a
distributed system such as fault tolerance and job scheduling, all of this transparent
to the programmer. Second, the possibility to scale out when more nodes are added
to the computational cluster without changing the main program guarantees the
portability of the proposed solution to different cluster configurations. We modified
the our implementation shown in Section 3.3.2 by incorporating all the features that
we have found so far.
3.5.1 Spatial Partitioning Phase
Scalability In this work, we propose a small modification in the k-means algo-
rithm to handle data skewness. Although far from perfect, our heuristic tests for
large variations in the sizes of the partitions, using Interquartile Ranges (IQR), and
recomputes k-means on those outstanding partitions. Our experiments show that
this heuristic works well when centroids are biased toward outliers or small sized
partitions. However, there is still a change of large partitions after the heuristic,
that is a consequence of poor selection of centroids.
Our k-means implementation is efficient in the sense that we do not emit all the
records through the network. We rely on a Combiner function that aggregates points
in local centroids and emits weighted aggregated points to reducers. Reducers obtain
streams of weighted points and compute a weighted average, emiting the resulting
centroid.
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Figure 3.10: MapReduce: Spatial Partitioner algorithm data flow
We partition the datasets based on geographical component. Data skewness
may harm the load balancing of the overall join algorithm. The reason is that a
clustering technique may favor closeness to centroids rather than number of records
in each cluster. We note that our previous Xmeans implementation tries to guess the
best number of clusters. A partitioning technique can be derived with this method.
However, Xmeans relies on Bayesian Information Criterion or Akaike Information
Criterion [PM]. Although the technique is effective in determining a good number
of clusters, it does not solve the balance problem i.e. if a cluster of a low number
of records seem to be far away, the number of records are unlikely to merge to
satisfy the minimum number of records require for the each cluster. The work of
Ng et.al [NH94] seems to be promising but it has a major drawback for very large
datasets: it requires high level of computations for solving the nonlinear optimization
problem of k-means. We proposed a much simpler but powerful heuristic that seem
to work very good in large datasets.
We note that we are not interested in finding the best possible solution for load
balancing and the same time satisfying the constraint of the best partition. Solving
that kind of problem seems to require a lot of computation and those two constraints
are unlikely to be satisfied efficiently with a simple heuristic. We believe that the
bulk of operations are centered in the local computation of the join. Therefore,
a load balancing strategy that performs reasonable well is likely to produce good
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results. The main problem with any type of load balancing technique in this join is
that the accuracy radii of the considered objects may overlap several clusters. If the
partition forces the object to be repeated in several clusters, then we cannot just
simply reassign the object to another cluster. The object is to be kept within the
cluster. Also, even if the cluster does not have the required minimum number of
objects, it would be useless to assign objects that would not match between them,
just because we need to satisfy a quota of minimum objects.
Our solution works as follows: Let k be the number of clusters used. Each
cluster is supossed to have the maximum number of records allowed to compute a
join. We then compute the IQR (interquantile range) of the number of records per
cluster [TD00]. For all clusters that have more than the upper fence value (UFV)
e.i. more than Q3 + 1.5 ∗ IQR, we split them based on the median value mv of the
clusters. Then, we compute kx = N/mv that we use to further compute a kx-means
algorithm.
Here, we briefly explain the modification for the spatial partitioning procedure,
in order to load-balance the clusters.
• Each mapper simply maps the records that need further parititioning.
• On each reducer: first, we set M = n/k. For each centroid c (in the reducer),
if centroid c has more than 2M counts, let it be |c|. If set m = |c|/M then run
an m-means with the centroids in the reducer. Then we eliminate previous
centroid and we add the new m centroids.
3.5.2 Local Join Implementation
We briefly explain our approach for computing local joins using two different data
structures. As we shown before, local joins run on each reducer. In order to decrease
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Figure 3.11: MapReduce: Local Join algorithm data flow.
the running time, we implemented two spatial data structures that we describe
below.
SpsJRTree. This algorithm uses a lightweight R-tree [Gut84] implementation. We
augment the original algorithm with a textual data structure similar to inverted
files for text processing, that we call token file (TF). TF is simply an extension of
the inverted file. It maps tokens to lists of nodes that contain the token. It was
implemented as a hash table with double indirection for fast retrieval of nodes. To
fill out the TF, once the R-tree has been built, the algorithm extracts the tokens
from the records at the leaves. For each token at the leaf, it checks if the current leaf
has not been added in the list of nodes of the token in TF. If not, then the algorithm
inserts it and continues recursively using its parent. The base case occurs when the
current node has been inserted in the TF list of the probed token. For this algorithm
to be memory efficient, several optimizations can be done. First, the nodes of the
TF data structure may leverage the frequency of the token. For frequent tokens,
the size of the buckets is bounded by the number of nodes. However, for infrequent
tokens e.g. tokens that appear just one time, the size is bounded by the height of
the R-tree. Another optimization can be done by observing the distribution of the
tokens in the nodes. Infrequent tokens may map the same nodes if they belong to
the same leaf, so we can collapse the inverted lists of both tokens. However, this
requires additional work in the algorithm and , for efficiency, we need to keep it
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simple. SpsJBoxSort. This implementation uses a space efficient data structure
called Box Sort tree [Hou87]. The Box Sort tree is similar to a k − dtree but for
polygons. One advantage it has w.r.t the R-tree is the small amount of data used
to maintain it. The space complexity is O(n), where n is the size of the input data
and search queries are guaranteed log(n). This data structure is suitable for this
problem not only because of the space complexity, but also because we do not need
to perform deletions or insertions in the local joins.
We also included text information in the nodes that allow us to prune unnecessary
branches when we do not find tokens that are deeper in the leaves. In Section 3.6.1
we compare SpsJBoxSort and SpsJRtree for performance.
As a caveat, we noted that the radius picked for our algorithms can have a
significant impact in the performance. The reason is that objects have accuracy
radii. This accuracy radius may be very large, so in that case, our R-tree or Box Sort
will have too much overlaping which implies that spatial search is not as effective as
token pruning. On the other hand, if the precision radius is small, spatial prunning
is quite effective and token prunning becomes important only at high levels of the
R-tree. That is the main reason that we use text augmentation in both of our
algorithms for spatial set-similarity joins.
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Algorithm 1 Spatial Set-Similarity Join algorithm
1: procedure SpsJoin(R,S, k, type)
Spatial Partitioner Phase:
2: if type = LEFT then
3: C ← spatialPartitioner(R) . This works for Left outer join only
4: end if
Local Join Phase:
5: Candidates← ∅ . List of candidate pairs < r, list[s] >, s ∈ S
6: Map each o ∈ R ∪ S to pairs < ci, o > such that o.MBR overlaps ci ∈ C
7: for all ci ∈ C do . In parallel
8: Reduce localJoiner(ci,list[oi])
9: Append < r, list[s] > pairs to Candidates
10: end for
Filtering Phase:
11: for all candi ∈ Candidates do . In parallel
12: < r, l >← candi
13: Gi ←
⋃
s∈l s.MBR
14: Create vocabulary V from terms in l and r
15: Compute Girft(Gi) for each t ∈ V
16: fl← ∅ . Priority queue of size k
17: for all s ∈ l do
18: Push < sim(r, s), (r, s) > to lf
19: end for
20: while fl 6= ∅ do
21: Pop fl . Returns pairs < sim(r, s), (r, s) >
22: end while
23: end for
24: end procedure
3.5.3 On Radius and Distance Computations
The precision radius is inherent in the object and depends on the resolution that the
location of the object was measured. Every SpsJoin operation may have different
purposes. For instance, it may be used to improve location of one dataset using
another dataset. In this case, the imprecise location is rather large and intersection
of radii play an important role to find the right candidate. On the other hand,
if the join is composed with objects with precise location, the precision radii are
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small. In this case, radius overlap may not match any object. An example of this
is a join between Flickr dataset and Yellow Pages. Precision radii are small on
both. To handle this issue we define what we use the default radius we defined in
Section 3.6.1. For instance, if we know that Flickr has geolocated objects at certain
radii, we increase the default radius to 200 meters to account for people who have
taken pictures far away from the target.
3.6 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we describe the performance evaluation of our techniques and pro-
posed algorithms. We evaluate the precision of our join using a ground truth dataset
that we built for this purpose. In order to understand the performance of the parallel
algorithms we measure absolute running time, relative speedup and scaleup [DG92].
Our testbed is a two processor AMD machine with 24 cores 16MB cache machine
with 256GB RAM operating at 1066MHz with 12 x 500GB disk drives at 7200
RPM SATA. For our experiments we used Hadoop v1.0. in a pseudo-distributed
configuration. The machine was configured with a SELinux Carbon Release 6.2
operating system, running Java 1.6 JVMs. In order to maximize performance, we
set up the replication factor to 1 and disable the speculative task execution feature.
In order to exercise our join algorithm, and to test precision of the join, we used
the following real world datasets:
• WPMIA. It has over 1.3M records of white pages in the city of Miami.
Each record contains first name, last name, phone, title, address, city, state
and geographic coordinates. The attributes that we used for joining are the
address and the geographic locations. Note that the accuracy of this dataset
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may vary, as it underwent a geocoding process. The total size of this dataset
is 145Mb.
• PRMIA It has over 360K records of parcels in the city of Miami. Each record
contains a parcel ID, Folio number, registered owner, address and geographic
coordinates. It is worth noting that this dataset has very accurate geographic
coordinates. The accuracy radius is approximately 15 meters, as these are
GPS coordinates. The attributes used for computing the join are
We evaluate and discuss our techniques in two different layers: performance and
precision of the join. We tested SpsJRTree and SpsJBoxSort approach. We used
WPMIA and PRMIA to test performance and Section 3.6.2 describes a ground truth
data set to test precision.
3.6.1 Performance
We observed that a nested loop approach of an SpsJoin to handle such large amounts
of data is simply a waste of computation and time, specially if users rent cloud
computing solutions. Therefore, we do not compare our algorithms with the naive
case. Instead, we assume that our baseline partitions the data using the spatial
attributes. We test our two approaches, SpsJBoxSort and SpsJRTree and evaluate
their performance.
For each approach, we tested its running time but we also show its ideal speedup
curve. Figure 3.12a shown the running time of both approaches and also its speedup.
For instance, if the cluster has twice as many reducers and the data size does not
change, the approach should be twice as fast. Figure 3.12b we show the same
numbers, but plotted on a relative scale. That is, for each number of reducers, we
plot the ratio between the running time for the smallest cluster size and the running
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time of the current cluster size. For example, for the 10-reducers run, we plot the
ratio between the running time on the 2-reducer cluster and the running time on
the 10-reducer cluster. We can see that all two combinations have similar speedup
curves, but none of them speed up linearly.
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Figure 3.12: Running time and Relative speedup for SpsJBoxSort and SpsJRTree
3.6.2 Join Precision
In this section we test the precision of our join. To that end, we created a ground
truth that allow us to measure and fine-tune the parameters needed to get as much
true positives as possible.
Ground Truth
SpsJoin combines records from two datasets and returns the most similar pairs based
on the similarity function we described in 3.3. However, the best match s ∈ S of
an object r ∈ R may not be necessarily an actual match. For instance, it may be
the case that John S. Smith has a best match Alice Smith in a given dataset S.
Defining a threshold is good way to address this problem but the question of how
large it should be remains unanswered.
In this section, we define a ground truth or a golden dataset, so that we can have
an idea of the value of the thresholds and parameters that we should set our system.
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It is important to note that this threshold depends on the type of the set-similarity
and distance functions. For example, when computing a SpsJoin on Flickr dataset
and Yellow Pages, we may use overlap similarity to match pairs and we might be
interested in high overlap of infrequent keywords. This overlap may be small but
the keywords involved can be so rare they may boost the overall similarity measure.
If the datasets has nothing in common textually and geographically, then a
spsjoin is not the correct approach. There are efficient techniques to determine a
similarity join selectivity. In particular [LNS11] use stratified sampling methods to
sample both datasets, defining mutually exclusive strata that will be joined using
LSH techniques. Unfortunately, this approach does not seem to work for spsjoins,
since LSH techniques require metrics in a metric space that satisfy the triangle
inequality.
Measuring the precision performance of an spsjoin is difficult without a ground
truth. Therefore, for our ground truth we used an already known join of two datasets
on a given, basically an already computed relational join.
3.6.3 Experiment Definition
In order to measure the precision of our join, we used an already computed join
called CALLREAL. This file contains MLS Real Estate listings in Miami-Dade county
that are updated daily. It consists of several characteristics of the parcels such as
number of beds, number of bathrooms, number of rooms and other geographic and
non geographic information. This dataset is the result set of a join between the
ALLREAL and FLPROPERTIES on the folio number, which is a unique identifier of the
parcels.
We can test the precision of an SpsJoin by splitting this join into its original
datasets and rejoin them again, but this time using an SpsJoin.
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Figure 3.13: ROC Curves: True positive - False positive rates
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Figure 3.14: ROC Curves: True negative - False negative rates
Then, in the experimention we will compute a SpsJoin on ALLREAL and the
dataset of florida parcels FLPROPERTIES on their address and it geographic coor-
dinates. Note that the addresses of a matching pair may not be exact. This also
implies that the location is approximate, since each dataset might have been treated
with different geocoders. Therefore, the matching is fuzzy.
We run our experiments following an incremental approach until we obtained
good performance. This performance can be shown through ROC curves [SSBL05].
ROC curves are graphical plots that illustrate the performance of binary classifiers
as their discrimination thresholds are varied. We harness their power to show our
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incremental approach. They can show the percentage of false positives versus the
percentage of true positives as the threshold is varied during the experiment.
For instance, Figure 3.13a shows an ROC curve using the similarity value. In the
x axis, the ROC curve is showing the percentage of false positives. The y axis shows
the percentage of true positives. Parallel to the y axis there is an odometer that
shows the different similarity values. This odometer is useful to pick a threshold
value that maximizes the number of true positives.
We can see from the figure that selecting a threshold ≥ 0.45, we will get about
40% of true positives. However, with a threshold ≥ 0.34 we get 45% of true positives,
but we need to tolerate 10% of false positives.
In order to improve the performance of our metrics, we propose the similar-
ity/entropy score. The rationale for defining such a score is that, as the similarity
increases, our uncertainty in selecting a best match decreases. Therefore, large val-
ues of this score are likely to capture more true positives. Figure 3.13b shows this
improvement. From the plot, we can see that tolerating 10% of false positives, we
get up to 70% of true positives. This means a 25% improvement over the similarity
approach.
We also experimented with the rate of false negatives. Figure 3.14 shows a
similar analysis using both, the similarity metric and the entropy score. In this case
we do not see a huge improvement when we tolerate a 10% false negatives. The rate
of true negatives is very similar (65%) in both, Figure 3.14a and Figure 3.14b.
In conclusion, this ground truth allowed us to measure the precision of our join.
It was shown that a threshold of 1.8 in the entropy score gives the best performance,
capturing a good number of true positives. The main drawback is that we will not
be able to get 100% of true positives. The main reason is that matching two records
may depend on other attributes that are not being considered in the similarity
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function. However, this system gives an initial step in matching pairs of records
from two different datasets using similarity functions.
3.7 Appendix
In this section, we describe how to setup the experiments using the system im-
plemententation described in this chapter. We also document each module of the
system for further reference.
3.7.1 SpsJoin Implementation
As described in Section 3.6, SpsJoin was implemented in Java 1.6. We used Apache
Hadoop V.1.0 and it is available open source in [Apa12].
The source code was created using NetBeans IDE 7.2, available in [Net].. Net-
Beans is an Integrated Development Environment (IDE) that provides the user with
comprehensive facilities for software development. The default configuration of Net-
Beans includes a Java compiler and other plugins e.g. Tomcat, but other languages
can be used.
The different modules of the system were developed in separate projects each.
This means that each module is part of a java package that was shipped in jar files.
However, when it is deployed to the cluster, the source code was recompiled and
shipped in a single jar for execution. More details are described below.
Cluster Configuration
In Section 3.6, we mentioned that the cluster was configured using the pseudo-
distributed mode. The status of the job tracker of the cluster can be queried using
the URL http://131.94.128.150:50030/jobtracker.jsp.
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In order to configure the cluster, a user was created. The nickname of the user
is hadoopuser. This user is the one that owns the source code and can perform
the executions. To get access to the code, log in with hadoopuser. From the
home folder, go to the /hadoop folder. This folder contains the instalation of the
cluster. The user can also modify the configuration by modifying the hadoop files
core-site.xml, mapred-site.xml and hdfs-site.xml. For instance, to modify
core-site.xml, run the following commands
% cd /hadoop/conf
% nano core-site.xml
The above commands will open a text editor so that the XML file can be modified
for a new configuration. Check [Apa12] for documentation about Hadoop cluster
configuration.
We may check the status of the HDFS’s Namenodes by querying the URL
http://131.94.128.150:50070/dfshealth.jsp. As we can see, the cluster is con-
figured with a single Namenode with no replication. The reason for this is that the
machine has been set with a RAID 6 controller.
SpsJoin Source Code
SpsJoin source code is available in the folder /spsjoinSoftware. It contains all
unpacked modules of the system. However, when the program is executed, all source
is compiled and packed in a jar file called alllibs.jar. The breakdown of the
modules, with their respective folders and descriptions is shown in Table 3.2.
Note that folder parallelspsjoin contains only .class files that forms the
main program. The actual source code can be found in the allsrc folder, under file
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Table 3.2: List of modules in SpsJoin
Folder Description
boxsort Implements of the Box Sort data structure
com Implements the Bloom Filter data structure
genericextractor Contains the XML parser and other utilities
geometry Implements Rectangle and other geometry classes
onedimensionalpartition A unidimensional k-means implementation
parallelkmeans Implements spatial partitioner in Java
parallelsampler Implements a random sampler for the input data
parallelspsjoin Contains the .class files of the main SpsJoin program
rtreeimpl Implements a lightweight R-Tree (experiments)
mrUtil Utilities for parallelsampler
utils Package with utilities e.g. Similarity functions
names SpsJoinRTree.java and ClusterPartitioner.java. The process to com-
pile and generate a full jar package for execution is as follows
% cd /home/hadoopuser/spsjoinSoftware/
% javac -classpath /hadoop/hadoop-core-1.0.1.jar:allsrc
-d allsrc allsrc/*.java
% jar -cvf alllibs.jar -C allsrc/ .
Once the file alllibs.jar is created, we can run it in Hadoop.
3.7.2 Creating A Configuration File
SpsJoin requires an XML file that provides the main parameters of the system
execution. This XML file can be created using any text file editor. This file has to
be stored in the /spsjoin folder. In this section we provide the description of the
parameters along with an example XML. The folder /spsjoinSoftware contains
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a template that can be used to modify the join execution. Here we provide some
definitions of concepts used throughtout this Section.
Primary textual field. It is the main textual attribute that the join operation
uses for content similarity matching.
Secondary textual field. It is the optional textual attribute that the join opera-
tion uses in case the primary textual attribute has no match with any of the terms
in the content similarity. In case where match is on primary and secondary, the join
operation keeps the content similarity that achieves the largest one.
Radius. it is constant that defines a circle around the point coordinates of the
record such that there is a high confidence that the object lies entirely within this
circle.
Default Radius. It is a dataset dependent radius that expresses the default preci-
sion radius of the objects in the dataset. In other words, it is the smallest precision
radius that an object can achieve in the current dataset. For instance, if we know
that Yellow pages has many objects with rooftop level precision, we may assign a
30 meters default radius for matching.
Padded Radius. It is the sum of the radius of an object and a positive constant.
Note that the confidence of the object lying within its padded radius increases.
Distance Threshold. It is the maximum distance radius that the system will use
to search for objects. By default it is set to 3 miles.
Similarity Threshold. It is the threshold used to filter best candidates. It depends
on the experiments that we defined in the previous Section.
Now we show an example of the XML file that we used to configure the system.
The file starts with a main tag called “parameter” and its subfields are defined
within.
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<parameters>
<joinType>LEFT</joinType>
<simtype>0</simtype>
<relation>
<id>R.asc</id>
<primary>name</primary>
<secondary></secondary>
<latitude>latitude</latitude>
<longitude>longitude</longitude>
<defaultRadius>200</defaultRadius>
</relation>
<relation>
<id>S.asc</id>
<primary>title</primary>
<secondary></secondary>
<latitude>latitude</latitude>
<longitude>longitude</longitude>
<defaultRadius>200</defaultRadius>
</relation>
</parameters>
3.7.3 Running SpsJoin
SpsJoin can be run using the alllibs.jar. This section provides an step-by-step
process along with an example that shows the execution process. We begin by se-
lecting the datasets that we are going to use for the operation. We assume that
these datasets are stored in a local disk. In our case, they are stored in TFoverlays
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folder. Also, we have to create the XML configuration file that SpsJoin uses for
execution, as we showed in Section 3.7.2.
SpsJoin Directory Structure
Spsjoin operates in the Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS). The root of the
directory structure is the folder /spsjoin. Table 3.3 shows a breakdown of the
folders in /spsjoin folder along with their description. The /input folder feeds
SpsJoin with input datasets along with their header files. The user has to make
sure that both, the name of the file and the header have the same name. The only
difference is that the header file contains the extension “.header” appended in the
name. The /kmeans folder records the execution of the spatial partitioner. This is
a k-means algorithm that runs several times depending on the number of iterations
set by the user and the activation of the load balancer. The output (the list of
centroids) is kept in a subdirectory called /finalcentroids in the mergedFile file.
The /modinput folder contains the modified input of the SpsJoin program. It was
created to add an additional surogate key. This is done because we have identified
that several datasets do not include a unique key in their fields. This is necessary
to join the original records after the SpsJoin execution. Note also that the new files
are renamed as “R.asc” and “S.asc”. This way, SpsJoin identifies the provenance
of the records when processing the files in Hadoop. Recall that Hadoop does not
differenciate between files in its input so we take advantage of the split names to
identify them. The /output folder stores the SpsJoin output after the execution of
the main algorithm. It only contains a set of files in SpsJoin format with the ids of
the matches and other information. Note that this is not the final output. The folder
/recordJoin contains the final result set. It has two subdirectories that records its
execution. The result set is stored in the folder /output2. Finally, the /sampler
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Table 3.3: List of folders in spsJoin folder
Folder Description
input Stores input datasets
kmeans Records the execution of K-means
modinput Stores the input with surogate keys
output Stores the output of SpsJoin (no original records)
recordJoin Stores the result set with original records
sampler Records the execution of the sampler algorithms
folder is used basically to store the execution of the sampler algorithm. It is the
input of the kmeans algorithm so it is created along the way in the SpsJoin execution.
Running Example
Now that we know how the directory structure is built, we can show the step-by-step
process to run an SpsJoin. First, we copy the input files from a local directory to the
HDFS. Recall to always log in using the hadoopuser username to run the program.
Also, the user has to run ssh localhost before running the system. The following
commands show how the execution works.
% hadoop dfs -copyFromLocal /home/hadoopuser/data/* /spsjoin/input/
Then, copy the XML configuration file:
% hadoop dfs -copyFromLocal
/home/hadoopuser/spsjoinSoftware/spsjoin.config.xml /spsjoin/
These commands copy the input files and the configuration file from local disk to
the HDFS. After this, we can run the sampler. This module basically samples the
dataset in order to obtain a good initial seed of centroids needed in the spatial par-
titioner. We proceed by running the following command
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% hadoop jar /spsjoinSoftware/alllibs.jar parallelsampler.Sampler
100 4 groundTruthR.asc groundTruthS.asc
The parallel sampler receives three parameters, the sampling rate (100), the number
of initial seed centroids (4) and two datasets. As mentioned before, the output of
the parallel sampler is the input of the spatial partitioner.
At this point, we have what we need to run the spatial partitioner. Our spatial
partitioner is a k-means algorithm that also runs a load balancer when the size of the
clusters are not evenly distributed. In order to run it, we have to use the following
command
% hadoop jar /spsjoinSoftware/alllibs.jar parallelkmeans.Kmeans 3 2 0
The spatial partitioner receives three parameters: the number of iterations (3), the
number of reducers used in the execution (2) and the mode (0). This mode is used
primarily to determine if this is a first time executing the partitioner or a subsequent
time, 0 for first time or 1 for the rest. It is useful only in experimentation.
Once we run the spatial partitioner, we are ready to execute the main join pro-
gram. The following command shows how.
% hadoop jar /spsjoinSoftware/alllibs.jar parallelspsjoin.SpsJoinRTree
The main program receives only one parameter, which is the number of reducers
that are going to be used in the execution. As mentioned before, this program leaves
the output in the /output folder. The resulting file is not a final file. This process
has to undergo another procedure to join the original records. To do this, we run
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the following command
% hadoop jar /spsjoinSoftware/alllibs.jar recordsjoin.JoinRecords 1
The record join receives one parameter: the mode. Mode is an integer that can be
one or two. By default, it should be one. Two is only for debugging purposes.
3.7.4 Appendix Conclusions
We have shown how to run SpsJoin using simple Unix commands. The system has
been implemented using Java 1.6 and Hadoop V 1.0. It is important to note that we
used the last version of Hadoop by the time this document was written. This system
can also be extended to handle more interesting variants of joins, such as multi-way
joins. SpsJoin showed great precision and scalability and future improvements will
definitively benefit from this initial version.
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CHAPTER 4
TOWARDS PRIVACY PRESERVING LOCATION BASED SERVICE
APPLICATIONS. THE SAFE CITIES CASE.
In this chapter, we address privacy concerns and motivate LBS applications in the
context of Safe Cities, using a mixed spatial and nonspatial approach. Overall, this
chapter aims to enable the vision of smart and safe cities, by exploiting mobile and
social networking technologies to securely and privately extract, model and embed
real-time public safety information into quotidian user experiences. We provide
novel approaches to define location and user based safety metrics. We devise iSafe,
a privacy preserving algorithm for computing safety snapshots of co-located mobile
devices as well as geosocial network users. In our analysis, we leverage SpsJoin to
find venues that have not been reviewed and to further compute the crime indices
of their locations.
Acknowledgements. I would like to acknowledge Mr. Mahmudur Rahman. He
contributed to specific parts shown in this chapter and gave valuable insights. In
Sections 4.7 and 4.8.4, he wrote Android source code for the iSafe algorithm and
for the web server-plugin. He performed crime forecasting experiments, as shown in
Section 4.8.2, and he currently mantains the website of the iSafe project.
4.1 Introduction
Modern technological advances and, in particular mobile devices and online social
networks, have paved the way toward a smarter management of resources in today’s
cities. As population density grows and natural disasters and man-made incidents
(e.g., hurricanes, earthquakes, riots [LAR12, Fra12, Eng12]) impact increasing num-
67
ber of people, maintaining the safety of citizens, an essential smart city component,
becomes a problem of paramount significance and difficulty.
We envision an LBS system where users are seamlessly made aware of their
safety in a personalized manner, through quotidian experiences such as navigation,
mobile authentication, choosing a restaurant or finding a place to live. This is a
clear definition of a LBS where location data is of paramount importance. The main
objective of this system is to motivate the use of a location service that addresses
privacy concerns but at the same time, tackles an interesting problem in smart, safe
cities. We propose to achieve this vision by introducing a framework for defining
public safety. Intuitively, public safety aims to answer the question “Will location
L present any danger for user A when she visits L at a future time T”?
An important challenge to achieving this vision is the need to properly under-
stand and define safety. While safety is naturally location dependent, it is also
inherently volatile. It not only exhibits temporal patterns (e.g., function of the
season, day of week or time of day) but also depends on the current context (e.g.,
people present, their profile and behavior). Furthermore, as suggested by the above
question, public safety has a personal dimension: users of different backgrounds are
likely to be impacted differently by the same location/time context.
Previous attempts of making people safety-aware include the use of social media
as a means to distribute information about unreported crimes [FAdO+10], or web
based applications for visualizing unsafe areas [Cri, Gua]. The main drawbacks of
these solutions stem from the difficulty of modeling safety and of integrating its
use in the everyday life of people. Instead, here we investigate the combination of
space and time indexed crime location datasets, with mobile technologies and online
social networks to provide personalized and context aware safety recommendations
for mobile and social network users.
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Specifically, we first define location centric, static crime and safety labels, based
on recorded crime events. We take advantage of observed crime behavior period-
icities, to conjecture that location safety values are predictable. To verify this hy-
pothesis, we investigate the ability of timeseries forecasting tools to predict future
location crime and safety index values based on recorded crime events.
Moreover, we use mobile device and geosocial network technologies to record the
trajectory trace of a user: the set of (location, time) pairs where the user has been
present. When sufficient crime information exists to enable an accurate prediction
of location based crime levels, we introduce the concept of personalized safety rec-
ommendations: A user U is safe at a location L, if the average crime index of the
locations in U ’s trajectory trace equals or exceeds the crime index predicted for the
near future at L.
When insufficient crime information exists at a given location, we propose to
augment the “context” of the location with data collected from co-located mobile
devices and geosocial networks. We define the vicinity crime metric, to be the
chance of crime events being reported around a user or a group of users, based on
their past location trajectories. We introduce then the concept of context aware
safety recommendations: a user U is safe around users U1, .., Uk if U ’s vicinity crime
metric equals or exceeds the aggregate vicinity crime metric of users U1, .., Uk.
Furthermore, through the statistical χ2 test we show that dependencies exist be-
tween the quantity and quality of reviews venues receive in Yelp (a popular geosocial
network) and the crime indexes of the venues’s locations. We then propose to simi-
larly augment spatiotemporal context with trajectory traces collected from geosocial
network users. We leverage SpsJoin from Chapter 3 on Yelp venues and geolocated
businesses to find venues that have not been reviewed and to further compute the
crime indices of their locations.
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The approach outlined above relies on the ability to aggregate user location
trajectories. Access to the trajectory traces of users, along with associated crime
and safety index values, either by other users or a centralized service provider,
raises significant privacy concerns: even social network providers have been shown
to leak [KW10] and sell [SF] user data to third parties.
To address this issue, we devise iSafe, a distributed algorithm that takes advan-
tage of the wireless capabilities of mobile devices to compute real-time snapshots of
the safety profiles of close-by users in a privacy preserving manner. iSafe uses secret
splitting and secure multi-party computation mechanisms to aggregate the trajec-
tories of co-located users without learning the private information of participants.
We have implemented iSafe as a browser plugin component and an Android
application. We provide extensive evaluations of our contributions using crime and
census data from the Miami-Dade county (FL) as well as data we have collected
from the accounts of users and businesses in Yelp [Yel], a popular geosocial network
centered on user feedback. Our experiments performed on a testbed consisting of
several smartphones show that the Android iSafe app is efficient: the computation
overhead is a few milliseconds while the communication overhead is a few hundred
milliseconds. The iSafe project can be found online [iSa], providing downloadable
Chrome plugin and Android app executables.
4.2 Model and Background
The framework consists of three participants, (i) a service provider, (ii) mobile
device users and (iii) geosocial networks. The service provider, denoted by S in the
following, centralizes crime and census information and provides it upon request to
clients.
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Figure 4.1: Miami venue stats: Distribution of number of reviews per venue.
We assume the mobile devices are equipped with wireless interfaces, enabling
the formation of transient, ad hoc connections with neighboring devices. Devices
are also equipped with GPS interfaces, allowing them to retrieve their geographic
location. Devices have Internet connectivity, which, for the purpose of this work
may be intermittent. Users take advantage of Internet connectivity not only to
report to geosocial networks but also to retrieve crime information (both described
in the following). Each user needs to install an application on her mobile device,
which we henceforth denote as the client.
In the remainder of this section, we describe the geosocial network concept, the
crime and census datasets that we use in our work, detail several forecasting tools
we use and describe the attacker model we consider in this work.
4.2.1 Geosocial Networks
Geosocial networks (GSNs) such as Yelp and Foursquare extend classic social net-
works with the notions of (i) venues, or businesses and (ii) check-ins. Besides user
71
accounts, GSNs provide accounts also for businesses (e.g., restaurants, yoga classes,
towing companies, etc). Users “check-in” to report their location, in terms of their
presence at one of the venues supported by the GSN. Users can share check-in in-
formation with friends and also use it to achieve special status (badges, mayorships)
and receive frequent customer discounts from participating venues. In addition,
geosocial networks encourage and reward user feedback, in the form of ratings and
reviews, left for visited venues. Users rating range from 1 to 5 stars and are aggre-
gated to produce an overall venue rating.
Yelp Data. We have collected Yelp information from all the venues in the Miami-
Dade county, Florida, for a total of 7699 venues. For each venue, we have collected
the name, type and address, along with the list of reviews received. For each review,
we collected the home city and state of the reviewer.
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Figure 4.2: Miami venue stats: Distribution of venue ratings.
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Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of the per-venue number of reviews of Miami-
Dade venues, with a logarithmic y scale. It shows a long tail distribution, with
around 2000 venues having 1 review but only 1000 venues having 2 reviews. We
emphasize the low number of venues without reviews - only 177. Figure 4.2 shows
the distribution of the number of venues with an aggregated rating ranging between
1 and 5: Yelp reviews are mostly positive as most aggregate ratings are at or above
4 stars.
4.2.2 Crime Data
We use a historical database of more than 2.3 million crime incidents reported in the
Miami Dade county area since 2007 [Ter]. Each record is labeled with a crime type
(e.g., homicide, larceny, robbery, etc), the time and the geographic location where
it has occurred. We briefly document two problems we encountered when pre-
processing this data. First, since records come from different Police departments,
the crime type labels are non-uniform, (e.g., murder in Miami Beach vs. homicide
in North Miami). Second, crime reports include many minor incidents (e.g., fire
alarms issues), resulting in over 140 different crime types.
In order to standardize and eliminate ambiguities, we mapped crimes into 7
categories: Murder, Forcible Rape, Aggravated Assault, Robbery, Larceny/Theft,
Burglary/Arson, Motor Vehicle Theft. We removed minor crime reports that did
not fall into these categories. Due to the large number of records in the database,
manual mapping was infeasible. Instead, we have experimented with two machine
learning techniques for classifying each record: the Naive-Bayes (NB) classifier and
the Decision Trees (DT) classifier [TSK05a]. In order to build our training and test
sets, we manually annotated a random sample of 2000 records from different police
departments. Then, we split this subset of records into training and test datasets,
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of number of crime events per type of crime. Outcome of
DT classifier.
each containing 1000 records. We built our classifiers using the NLTK library [NLT].
The accuracy was measured using a simple metric that measures the percentage of
inputs in the test set that the classifier correctly labeled. For instance, a crime type
classifier that predicts the correct crime type 60 times in a test dataset containing
100 crime types, would have an accuracy of 60%. On our crime dataset, the NB
classifier achieved an accuracy of 91% and the DT classifier an accuracy of 98%.
Thus, we have used the outcome of the DT classifier. Figure 4.3 shows the crime
set’s distribution of the crime categories following the DT classification.
Let c denote the number of crime types. In our case, c = 7. Let CT =
{CT1, .., CTc} denote the set of crime types.
We use Census data sets [Cen10], reporting population counts and demographic
information. The data is divided into geographical extents e.g. polygons, called
census block groups. Each block contains information about the population within
(e.g., population count, various statistics). According to the data, Miami Dade
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Figure 4.4: Miami-Dade county: geographical distribution of population. Polygons
represent Census Block Groups.
county has a population of 2, 496, 435. Figure 4.4 shows the geographical distribution
of the population in the Miami Dade county.
4.2.3 Forecasting Tools
We describe here several time series forecasting tools that we use in our work.
ARIMA Model. ARIMA models incorporate autoregressive (p),integration(d)
and moving average terms(q) to provide higher fitting and forecasting accuracy.
ARIMA uses the input data to determine the appropriate model form. The ARIMA
forecasting procedure consists of four steps [TT02], (1) identifying the ARIMA(p,
d, q) structure, (2) estimating the unknown parameters, (3) fitting tests on the
estimated residuals and (4) forecasting future outcomes based on historical data.
Linear (Double) Exponential Smoothing (LES) Model. Brown’s linear (dou-
ble) exponential smoothing [Nau] includes trend variations of the time series without
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a significant seasonal component. The process is controlled by a smoothing param-
eter α whose value ranges between 0 and 1. α decides the weight placed on the
most recent observations during the forecast process. We determine the value of α
by minimizing the root mean squared error (RMSE) [HA01] from one step-ahead
forecasts and repeating the process for all forecast values.
Artificial Neural Network (ANN). ANNs are data-driven self-adaptive methods
that learn and generalize from experience and capture subtle functional relationships
among the empirical data even if the inherent relationships are unknown or difficult
to describe. In this chapter, we focus on the multi-layer perceptrons (MLP) ANN
model, which is particularly suitable for forecasting, due to its ability for input-
output mapping. The ANN we consider consists of an input layer (of the same size
as the input vector), two layers of hidden nodes and an output layer providing the
forecast value. Before the training phase, we normalize the input data to a (−1, 1)
range; following the prediction step we map the output back to the initial range.
For the training phase we use a multilayer feedforward network trained using back
propagation and the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm to perform function fitting
(nonlinear regression).
Error Measurement. We use the root mean squared error (RMSE) and mean
absolute percent error (MAPE) [HA01] as error measurements to evaluate the ac-
curacy of different models. MAPE can be easily affected by the magnitude of the
series but it does provide information about the relative magnitude of the forecast
error. On the other hand, RMSE is a more objective measure in absolute magni-
tude. Thus, in our evaluation, the RMSE is used as the primary and MAPE as the
secondary accuracy measure.
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Figure 4.5: Three day evolution of the number of crimes reported within one Miami-
Dade block.
4.2.4 Attacker Model
We assume a semi-honest, or honest-but-curious service provider. That is, the ser-
vice provider is assumed to follow the protocol correctly, but attempts to learn as
much user information as possible. We assume users can be malicious. However,
each participating user needs to install a provider-signed client application.
4.3 Location Based Safety
We exploit the crime dataset to define an initial, location-centric safety metric. We
divide space into census blocks. We divide time into fixed-length epochs, e.g., 1
hour long, 24 epochs per day. To understand the need for a time dependent safety
metric, we have studied the evolution in time of crimes reported within blocks of
the Miami-Dade county. Figure 4.5 shows the evolution over three consecutive days
(Friday-Sunday, July 15-17, 2011) of the number of crimes reported within one such
block, with a 3 hour time granularity. Most of the events are larcenies. The plot
shows a significant variance in the number of crimes reported throughout a day,
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Crime Type Weight
Assault 0.176
Robbery 0.180
Rape 0.307
Homicide 0.336
Table 4.1: Crime weight assignment using the FCPC.
with a spike between noon and 6pm. Thus, a fixed aggregate of past crime events
is unlikely to accurately define the present.
Block crime and safety indexes. For a census block B and an epoch e denoted
by the time interval ∆T , let C(B,∆T ) represent a c-dimensional vector, where the
i-th entry denotes the number of crimes of type CT [i] recorded in block B during
interval ∆T . Let W denote a c-dimensional vector of weights; each crime type of
CT (defined in Section 4.2.2) has a weight proportional to its seriousness (defined
shortly). Let BC(∆T ) denote the population count recorded for block B. We then
define the crime index of block B during interval ∆T as
CI(B,∆T ) = min{C(B,∆T )W
BC(∆T )
, 1} (4.1)
where C(B,∆T )W denotes the vectorial product between the number of crimes
per type and the weights of the crime types. That is, B’s crime index is the per-
capita weighted average of crimes recorded during interval ∆T . The safety index
SI of block B during interval ∆T is then defined as
SI(B,∆T ) = 1− CI(B,∆T ) (4.2)
Both the CI and SI metrics take values in the [0, 1] interval. Higher SI(B,∆T )
values denote safer blocks.
Crime weight assignment. We need to assign meaningful weights to the crime
types CT . An inappropriate assignment may make a large number of “lighter” of-
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fenses overshadow more serious but less frequent crime events, (e.g., consider larce-
nies vs. homicides). Assigning weights to crime types is also a subjective matter:
certain people are more likely to be vulnerable to certain crime categories. In the
following, we restrict our definition of safety to crimes against persons e.g., assault,
robbery, homicide and rape and ignore crimes against property. Although our model
can be applied to both categories, the focus of this work is on personal safety.
We propose to assign each crime type a weight proportional to its seriousness,
defined according to the criminal punishment code, i.e., the Florida Criminal Pun-
ishment Code (FCPC) [oC]. The FCPC is divided into levels ranging 1-10, and each
level Lk contains different types of felonies. The higher the level, the more serious is
the felony. Each felony has a degree, (i.e., capital, life, first, second and third degree,
sorted in decreasing order of seriousness), with an associated punishment (years of
imprisonment) [Hor].
Let Lk denote the set of felonies within level k and let Pk denote the set of
corresponding punishments. Let lk = |Lk| denote the number of felonies within
level k. Then, we define the weight of crime type CT [i], wi, as
wi =
10∑
k=1
ρk
Pk[i]∑lk
j=1 Pk[j]
,
where ρk = k/
∑10
i=1 i is the weight assigned to level k (normalized to the sum of
the number of levels). The weight of crime type CT [i] is the weighted sum of the
per-level punishment value (Pk[i]) associated with the occurrence of CT [i] within
the felonies of level k, normalized to the total punishment of level k. Table 4.1 shows
the resulting weights.
Example. We exemplify the impact of level L8 on the weight of the “Robbery”
crime. Out of the felonies represented on level 8, two are related to “Robbery”:
“Robbery with a weapon” and “Home-invasion robbery”. Both are first degree
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felonies, therefore punishable with up to 30 years of imprisonment. The other rep-
resented felonies are “Homicide”, with 6 different counts, for a total of 135 years
penalty and “Rape”, with 1 count of up to 15 years penalty. Thus, the contribution
of level 8 to the weight of “Robbery” is 8
55
× 60
60+135+15
= 0.0415.
Illustration. We use the Miami-Dade crime set to illustrate the geographic dis-
tribution of block-level safety index information, where the epoch, denoted by the
interval ∆T , is the year 2010. We use the census dataset to extract the population
count BC(∆T ). Figure 4.6 shows the color-coded safety index for each block group
in the Miami-Dade county (FL) where crimes have been reported during 2010. The
safety index considers only crimes against persons. Blocks without color have a very
low reported crime level. Green blocks denote safer locations while darker yellow
and red blocks denote areas with more reported crimes.
Figure 4.6: Safety index illustration for the Miami-Dade county: SI(B,∆T ) values
are mapped into color-coded “safety levels”.
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4.4 Predicting Safety
The crime index computation of Equation 4.1 can only be performed for past epochs,
when all crime events have been reported. Safety information however is most
useful when provided for the present or near future. One way to compute the
predicted crime index of a block B for the next epoch denoted by the interval ∆T ,
PCI(B,∆T ), is the average crime index of the block during the same epoch in the
day for the past d days, where d is a system parameter (e.g., d=7 for 1 week of
recorded per-block history). This solution however is unable to detect and factor in
all crime periodicities, including seasonal, weekly and daily fluctuations. As such,
it may include unnecessary errors – e.g., higher number of crimes in a past August
may introduce inaccuracies in the crime index considered in the current month of
April.
We propose to address this issue through the use of the time series forecasting
techniques discussed in Section 4.2.3. Specifically, we use time series forecasting
tools to compute long and short term predictions of the number of crimes to be
committed within an area (e.g., census block, zipcode, city, etc), based on the area’s
recorded history.
Predicting crime and safety indexes. At the beginning of each epoch (de-
noted by the time interval ∆T ), we compute predictions for the number of crimes
of each crime type to be committed at each census block B during the epoch. Let
PC(B,∆T )[i] denote the predicted number of crimes of type CT [i]. Using a formula
similar to Equation 4.1 we compute the predicted crime index for B during inter-
val ∆T as PCI(B,∆T ) = min{PC(B,∆T )W/BC(∆T ), 1}. The predicted safety
index is then PSI(B,∆T ) = 1− PCI(B,∆T ).
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4.5 Personalized, Context-Aware Safety
The ultimate goal of defining crime and safety indexes is to provide users with safety
advisory information. People are however not equally exposed and vulnerable to all
crime types. Age, gender and an array of personal features, preferences and choices
play a central role in the perception of an individual’s safety. Since such informa-
tion may not be readily accessible, we use instead the localization capabilities of
a user’s mobile device to periodically record and locally store her trajectory trace.
This enables us to define the crime index level with which a user is comfortable: the
average crime index of the locations in her trajectory. When enough crime infor-
mation exists to enable the prediction of the near-future crime index of a location,
we introduce the concept of personalized safety : the user is safe if her comfortable
crime index level equals or exceeds the predicted crime index of her current location.
However, crime information is not always available or detailed enough to allow
a confident prediction of location crime index values. For instance, as shown in
Figure 4.5, the number of recorded events can quickly switch between 0 and 1 in
successive intervals. Accurately predicting event counts within a short time interval
is difficult, as the difference between 0 and 1 crimes is significant.
We propose to address this issue, by exploiting the intuition that the safety of
a place depends not only on its history but also on its current context. One way
to define the context of a place at a given time is through the people located there
at that time (in Section 4.6 we show how geosocial network data can be used to
construct context). We use the trajectory trace of the user to define the chance
of a crime to occur around the user and generalize this approach to compute the
chance of a crime to occur around groups of users. We then introduce the concept
of context aware safety : a user is safe if the chance of a crime to occur around her
82
equals or exceeds the chance of a crime to occur around the other users currently
co-located with her.
We take advantage of the wireless communication capabilities of user mobile
devices to form short lived, ad hoc communities with co-located devices and use
them to aggregate the trajectory information of their users. Since user trajectories
are sensitive information, we introduce iSafe, a distributed algorithm that allows
the aggregation of trajectory traces of co-located users while preserving the privacy
of involved participants.
4.5.1 Personalized User Safety
We extend the crime and safety index definitions from locations to users. We assume
the user’s device can capture the user’s location, e.g., using GPS or a combination
of celltower and Wi-Fi access point localization techniques. We assume a block
level localization precision. Let TJU = {[Bi, Ti, CI(Bi,∆Ti)]|i = 1..h} denote the
trajectory trace of user U , consisting of recorded [block, epoch, crime index] tuples.
∆Ti denotes the epoch encompassing time Ti when U was present at block Bi,
Ti ∈ ∆Ti. For privacy reasons, we require each user to store her trajectory trace on
her device.
We define the vicinity crime metric for a user U , VU to be the percentage of
the user’s trajectory places where crimes have been reported around the time of her
visit:
VU =
∑h
i=1 sgn(CI(Bi,∆Ti))
h
(4.3)
sgn(x) denotes the sign function, that is 0 when x is 0 , and 1 when x is larger than
0. For instance, if a user has 100 locations in her trajectory and crimes have been
reported at 60 of those locations during the epoch of the user’s presence, the user’s
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vicinity crime metric is 60%. We then define the crime index of a user U to be the
average crime index of locations in her trajectory:
CIU =
∑h
i=1CI(Bi,∆Ti)
h
(4.4)
Safety Decision With Accurate Crime Data
When user U is located at time Tc in a block B, where accurate past crime data exists,
allowing the proper prediction of the crime index, we compute the predicted crime
index PCI(B,∆T ), as specified in Section 4.4, where ∆T denotes the current epoch,
Tc ∈ ∆T . We then introduce the notion of personalized safety recommendation:
Definition 4.5.1 (Personalized safety). A user U is safe at a block B within time
interval ∆T , if CIU ≥ PCI(B,∆T ).
Intuition. A user is safe if the user’s crime index equals or exceeds the block’s
crime index predicted for the duration of the user’s presence. If the crime index
of the user’s current block, predicted for the epoch of the user’s presence, does not
exceed the user’s level of comfort, it means the user has spent at least half of her
time in locations with more crime than the current location. Thus, the user is likely
to be comfortable with the crime level of her current location.
Safety Decision Without Accurate Crime Data
Certain locations may have insufficient crime data to ensure an accurate prediction of
the location’s crime index. This is the case also during unexpected events (natural
and man made disasters) when the future does not reflect the past. To address
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this issue, we propose to use existing context information, collected from co-located
users. To achieve this, we exploit ad hoc networks established by devices of co-
located users.
Our approach is the following. We define the safety index of a user U to be the
chance of no event being reported in her vicinity: SIU = 1 − VU . Let U1, .., Uk be
the users co-located with user U . We define a super user SUP1..k, as a fictitious
user whose trajectory trace encompasses the trajectories of users U1, .., Uk. That
is, TJU1..k = TJU1 ∪ .. ∪ TJUk . We note that both users and super users can be
located in multiple blocks during the same epoch. We then use Equation 4.3 to
compute the vicinity crime metric of SUP1..k, VSUP1..k . We define the safety index,
SISUP1..k = 1 − VSUP1..k . These definitions enable us to introduce the notion of
personalized safety recommendation:
Definition 4.5.2 (Context-aware safety). A user U is safe in a context consisting
of neighboring users U1, .., Uk, if SIU ≤ SISUP1..k , i.e., VU ≥ VSUP1..k .
That is, the user is safe if it is surrounded by users whose aggregated safety index
is higher or equal to the user’s safety index.
Intuition. The safety index of a user encodes the chance of no event occurring
around the user. The safety index of a group of users (e.g., SUP1..k) is defined as
the chance of no event occurring around the group. Definition 4.5.2 states that a
user is safe if it is surrounded by a group of users whose aggregated chance of no
event occurring is higher or equal to the user’s chance of no event occurring. A low
safety index value does not imply the user is unsafe, but merely the fact that the
user spends time in places where events do occur. If the location sampling process is
done periodically, the formula naturally ensures that blocks where the user spends
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more time have more impact on the user’s safety index. Being around a group of
users whose aggregated safety index is low suggests that the place is likely to have
a low safety level.
4.5.2 iSafe
One question that remains to be answered is how can the above decisions be made
without requiring participating users to provide sensitive location traces and safety
index values. To answer this question, we introduce iSafe, a protocol that imple-
ments the above solution, in a privacy preserving aware fashion. iSafe consists of a
main procedure, C.safetyDecision(B,∆T ), executed periodically by C, at the C’s
user current block B.
Definition 4.5.3 (Location Privacy)
Let an adversary A control the service provider S and any number of clients, such
that the number of clients controlled by A at any location is at most NThr−c, where
NThr and c > 1 are integers. The challenger C controls a client C. A contacts C
at any time T . C invokes C.safetyDecision(B,∆T ), where B denotes C’s current
block and T ∈ ∆T . A outputs B′, its guess of the block B where C is located.
We say a solution provides location privacy if the advantage of A in this game,
AdvA = |Pr[B′ = B]− 1/n| is negligible.
Algorithm 2 shows the pseudocode of iSafe. In a first step, the client C installed
on the wireless-enabled mobile device of a user contacts the service provider S,
storing the crime and Census datasets. C retrieves the predicted crime index of the
block B where the user is located (line 12). This operation is performed privately,
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Algorithm 2 iSafe pseudocode.
1.Object implementation iSafe;
2. neighbor[] N; #set of neighbors
3. double CI, SI; #crime, safety indexes
4. double V; #vicinity crime prob
5. BigInteger R; #random value
6. BigInteger[] shares; #set of shares
7. BigInteger[] NShares; #shares of neighbors
8. int BWC; #blocks with crime
9. int TBlk; #total blocks visited
10. Operation int safetyDecision(Epoch ∆T)
11. B := getCurrentBlock();
12 PCIB := S.getPCI(B, ∆T);
13. if (PCIB! = −1) then return (CI ≥ PCIB);
14. else return cas(); fi
15. end
16. Operation int cas()
17. N := discoverNeighbors();
18. if (N.size < NThr) then return− 1;
19. BWCSUP := multiPartySum(0)− BWC;
20. TBlkSUP := multiPartySum(1)− TBlk;
21. return(V ≥ BWCSUP/TBlkSUP);
22. end
23. Operation BigInteger multiPartySum(int type)
24. R := getRandom();
25. shares := split(R, N.size);
26. for i := 1 to N.size do
27. send(N[i], shares[i]);
28. NShares[i] := recv(N[i]); od
29. int order := electLeaderOrder();
30. BigDecimal S := 0; int count := 0;
31. while (count < N.size) do
32. count := count + 1;
33. if (count = order) then
34. if (type = 0) then S := S + BWC + R;
35. else S := S + TBlk + R; fi
36. for i := 1 to |N| do S := S− NShares[i]; od
37. mcast(S);
38. else S := recv(); fi
39. od
40 return S;
41. end
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without the client leaking its location trace, by using a private information retrieval
technique [Gas04].
If the crime index of the block can be accurately predicted (line 13), the operation
returns the decision of Definition 4.5.1. Otherwise, it invokes the cas operation
(line 14). cas first discovers all the ad hoc neighbors of the user (line 17). If the
number of neighbors is below a system-wide threshold value, NThr, it returns -
1: not enough information exists to perform an accurate decision. Otherwise, it
invokes the multiPartySum operation twice, with different input arguments (lines
19-20). When invoked with argument 0, multiPartySum calculates BWCSUP , the
sum of the blocks with crimes visited by all the user’s neighbors. When invoked with
argument 1, multiPartySum calculates TBlkSUP , the sum of the total blocks visited
by all the user’s neighbors. Thus, the ratio of BWCSUP and TBlkSUP generates the
vicinity crime metric of the super user representing the user’s neighbors. In line 21,
cas returns the safety decision of Definition 4.5.2.
ThemultiPartySum operation is a secure multi-party sum evaluation. It achieves
privacy through the use of (i) frequently changing, random MAC addresses for user
devices and (ii) secret splitting. Each client generates a random value (line 24) and
splits it into shares – one for each neighbor. That is, if the random value is R, the
shares sh1, .., shk are generated randomly such that
∑k
i=1 shi = R. The client sends
each share to one neighbor (lines 26-27) and receives a share from each neighbor
(line 28). The clients engage in a leader election and order selection distributed
algorithm (line 29), where each client is assigned a unique identifier, between 1 and
k.
When a client’s turn comes, according to the order established, it adds either the
user’s BWC value (number of census blocks with events visited by the user) or the
user’s TBlk value (total number of blocks visited), according to the input variable
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type, and adds its random value R to the overall sum (S), (lines 34-35). It then
subtracts all the shares of secrets of its neighbors (line 36) and sends a multicast
of the result (line 37), reaching all its neighbors. If it’s not the user’s transmission
turn, the client blocks to receive the multicast values of its neighbors (line 38).
4.5.3 Analysis
We now prove the following results.
Theorem 4.5.4 An adversary A controlling k− c out of k participants in the iSafe
algorithm, can only find the sum of the input values (BWC or Tblk) of the remaining
c honest participants.
Proof. Secret splitting is information theoretical secure: Without knowing all the
shares of a secret, no information can be inferred about the secret. The adversary
A has access to all intermediate values multicast in Algorithm 2, as well as k − c
shares of the secret of each of the remaining c honest participants. Let Ri denotes
the random value of the i-th (honest) participant and let s1i, s2i, .., ski be the shares
received by that participant from all the other participants. Then, the sum Ri +
s1i + s2i + .. + ski is random and cannot be predicted by A: A only controls k − c
shares of Ri (out of k − 1 shares), but not Ri, thus the other c values in the sum
are random and not under the control of A. Thus, A cannot infer the value (BWC
or TBlk) of user i by comparing the value of S before and after user i’s multicast.
Theorem 4.5.5 iSafe provides location privacy.
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Proof. (Summary) The adversary A can only access user location information from
(i) user trajectory traces, (ii) queries made by iSafe (Algorithm 2 line 12) and
(iii) during computations of the aggregate super user crime and safety indexes (the
multiPartySum operation).
For the first point, we observe that user trajectories are only stored on the
the user’s mobile devices and are never shared with other participants. For the
second point, the queries made by users in iSafe to A are private, e.g., use PIR (see
Section 4.5.2). Thus, A cannot learn the location of the user with a probability
non-negligible higher than 1/n, where n is the number of census blocks, without
breaking the security of the PIR solution employed. The third point’s implicit
requirement is that the provider colludes with users in order to learn information
about their neighbors. The use of random, frequently changing MAC (or physical
device) addresses by participating devices prevents however even such a powerful
adversary from linking a device identifier to a user, thus linking a user to a location.
Moreover, Theorem 4.5.4 shows that if A controls at most NThr − c clients at any
location where at least NThr + 1 clients are located, A can only learn the sum of
the secret values of the remaining (at least c+1, c > 1) honest clients.
4.5.4 Attacks and Defenses
Safety profiles of co-located users are aggregated to obtain a safety image of loca-
tions. Since that image impacts user decisions, it can become the target of malicious
attacks. For instance, malicious users may attempt to incorrectly (i) improve the
safety of desired locations, for instance to attract unsuspecting users to unsafe lo-
cations or to (ii) decrease the safety image of target locations. We now describe
several mechanisms that could be exploited to perform these attacks, and suggest
defenses.
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Reporting incorrect locations. Malicious users may report incorrect locations,
corresponding to safe areas. Even with GPS verification mechanisms in place, com-
mitting location fraud has been largely simplified by the recent emergence of special-
ized applications for the most popular mobile eco-systems (LocationSpoofer [Bos11]
for iPhone and GPSCheat [GPS] for Android). To prevent this attack, location
verification mechanisms can be used [CP12, SW09, ZC11]. For instance, Carbunar
et.al. [CP12] has developed venue-centric location verification techniques, that rely
on devices installed by venue owners within their venues. In the scenario considered
in this chapter, the owners’ incentive for participation is to prevent the tampering
of the safety image of their neighborhood.
Turning off devices in unsafe areas. Users could turn off their iSafe application
when entering bad areas. While we cannot prevent this behavior, we propose to use
rewards and game mechanics to encourage people to report their location. For in-
stance, users gain points for each reported location, perhaps more for the occasional
unsafe location. Points are used to acquire badges, similar in principle to those used
by geosocial networks like Foursquare [fou] or Yelp [Yel].
4.6 Geosocial Network Extensions
Geosocial networks, with their emphasis on the location of both users and venues,
seem ideal candidates for augmenting spatiotemporal context. We first investigate
relations between crimes and geosocial networking activities. We then propose to
use geosocial network user location trajectories to improve the accuracy of iSafe.
91
St
an
da
rd
ize
d
R
es
id
ua
ls:
<
−
4
−
4:
−2
−
2:
0
0:
2
2:
4
>
4
Rating
Cr
im
e 
In
de
x 
Le
ve
ls
Rating 0.0 − 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4
Level 5
Figure 4.7: Relation between venue ratings and the crime index (CI) levels of their
location.
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4.6.1 Crime vs. Geosocial Activity Dependencies
We conjecture that the crime activity recorded at a location has a bearing on the
quality and quantity of reviews recorded at nearby venues. We investigate this
hypothesis through the combination of review data we collected from Yelp and the
Miami-Dade crime dataset.
One question we need to answer is whether there exists a relation between the
rating of a venue and the safety of its location. For this, we first mapped each
venue in the Miami-Dade county to its corresponding census block, then computed
Crime Index (CI) values for each block using the crime events of 2011. We need
to test for dependencies between two different mixed variables, (i) categorical user
ratings and (ii) continuous CI values. Since, linear regression or any other method
for continuous variables are not ideal, we discretized the CI variable into 5 levels,
using 1-dimensional k-means (k set to 5), that guarantees optimal partitioning for
one-dimensional data.
We have then built a contingency matrix, by grouping the venues according to
their ratings and assigning them to their corresponding CI level: each cell in the
contingency matrix contains the number of venues that have the corresponding user
rating and belong to a block having the corresponding CI level. We have used the
χ2 test to test the dependency between the two categorical variables [TD00]. We
used the R [R D11] package to compute the χ2 test and we obtained the p-value, or
the observed level of significance, and corresponding standard residuals. In short,
the standard residuals indicate the importance of the cell to the ultimate χ2 value;
by comparing standard residuals, one can easily identify the cells that contribute
the most to the χ2 test. Since the observed level of significance is extremely low
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(very close to zero) we reject the null hypothesis and therefore we conclude that
there exists a dependence between CI values and user ratings.
Figure 4.7 shows the corresponding mosaic plot, displaying the relationship be-
tween ratings and CI values: the areas of the rectangles are proportional to the
probabilities of the user ratings and to the conditional probabilities of the CI levels.
It shows that the bulk of the Yelp venues (even low rated ones) are in places where
crime levels are low. This can be due to the fact that the distribution of the venues
per CI values is long tail, which may be further explained by the fact that (i) in the
Miami-Dade county there are few areas with high crime levels and (ii) Yelp is not
popular in those areas - people may not even report venues located there in Yelp.
Moreover, as shown in Figure 4.2, Yelp ratings are biased toward higher values.
A second question is whether there exists a relation between the number of
reviews a venue receives and the safety of the venue’s location. Once again, even
though the number of reviews is not a categorical variable, it is discrete. Therefore,
we tested their association with CI values using the χ2 test. We created review
count interval buckets and we assigned each venue to one bucket according to its
number of reviews. We computed the range of the intervals using the 1-dimensional
k-means algorithm with k set to 10. The χ2 test produced a corresponding p-value
very close to zero, thus answering our question in the affirmative. Figure 4.8 shows
the corresponding mosaic plot of this experiment. It confirms that most Yelp venues
are located in safe areas as well as the long tail distribution of the number of reviews
per venue in Yelp, shown in Figure 4.1.
In order to identify the sources of the dependencies, we studied a specialized view
of this data - the relationship between review counts and crime types (see Section
4.2.2). One finding is depicted in Figure 4.9, showing the relationship between
reported rapes and review counts: rapes occur more frequently in places with low
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number of reviews. Furthermore, we study the relation between crime types and
the number of reviews received from visitors vs. locals. This information is publicly
available, as Yelp users need to specify a home city/state. Figure 4.10 shows that
the number of larcenies is high around venues with many local reviews. A potential
explanation is that local yelpers (Yelp users) are more likely to choose venues in
good neighborhoods, and good neighborhoods are more likely to attract thieves.
4.6.2 Geosocial iSafe
We propose to extend iSafe with geosocial network information. For each geosocial
network user U , we define the trajectory trace TJU = {[Bi,∆T,CI(Bi,∆Ti)]|i =
1..h}. Each TJU record consists of (i) the block containing a venue where U has
written a review, (ii) the time epoch ∆T when the user wrote the review and (iii)
the crime index of the block during that epoch. In Yelp, the timestamps associated
with reviews have a 1-day granularity, thus, ∆T is 1-day long.
While geosocial network user trajectories are likely to be more sparse than those
collected from mobile devices, their similar definition enables us to use Equations 4.3
and 4.4 to compute the user’s vicinity crime metric and crime index values. Further-
more, we use the vicinity crime metric and crime index values of users who wrote
reviews for a Yelp venue to compute aggregate venue crime index and vicinity crime
values, using the mobile version of iSafe (see Algorithm 2). These definitions allow
us to extend the personalized context aware safety decisions of Section 4.5.1.
4.7 iSafe Implementation
We implemented iSafe as a (i) web server, (ii) a browser plugin running in the
user’s browser and (iii) a mobile application. We use Apache Tomcat 6.0.35 to
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Figure 4.11: Snapshot of iSafe’s plugin functionality for a Yelp venue.
route requests (exposed to the client through a REST API interface) to our server-
side component. The server-side component relies on the latest servlet v3.0 which
offers additional features including asynchronous support, making the server-side
processing much more efficient.
4.7.1 Browser Plugin
We implemented the browser plugin for the Chrome browser using HTML, CSS and
Javascript. The plugin interacts with Yelp pages and the web server, using content
scripts (Chrome specific components that let us access the browser’s native API) and
cross-origin XMLHttpRequests. If our content script receives content from another
web site, it inspects it for cross-site scripting attacks before injecting the content
into the current page (e.g., to protect the user from a hijack attack). To store and
process review and user data for each venue, we use the SQLite 3.7.12.1 as the DB
server.
The idea behind the browser plugin is to extend the experience of geosocial
networks like Yelp [Yel] with safety information. Specifically, the browser plugin
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Figure 4.12: Snapshots of iSafe on Android.
becomes active when the user navigates to a Yelp page. For user and venue pages,
the plugin parses their HTML files and retrieves their reviews. We employ a stateful
approach, where the server’s DB stores all reviews of pages previously accessed by
users. This enables significant time savings, as the plugin needs to send to the web
server only reviews written after the date of the last user’s access to the page. The
initial access is likely to be slower, requiring the plugin to access multiple pages of
reviews.
Given the venue’s set of reviews, the server determines the corresponding review-
ers. Since we do not have access to the location trajectories of users, to compute a
user’s security label we rely on the venues reviewed by the user: The user safety is
computed as an average over the safety labels of the blocks containing the venues
reviewed by the user. Given the safety labels of reviewers, we determine the safety
level of the venue. The server sends back the safety level of the venue, which the
plugin displays in the browser. Figure 4.11 shows iSafe’s extension to the Yelp page
of the venue “Top Value Trading Inc.” in Hialeah, FL (central left yellow rectangle
containing iSafe’s safety recommendations).
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4.7.2 Mobile iSafe.
We have implemented the location centric static safety labeling component of iSafe
for a mobile application using Android. We used the Android Maps API to facilitate
the location based service employed by our approach. We represent safety using five
color labels ranging from green (safe) to red (unsafe).
We used the SQLite version 3.4.0 database to store the trajectory trace of the
user, along with timestamps, on her smartphone. The database also caches the
Census block structure and associated safety indexes for the city where the user is
located. This ensures both (i) privacy – the user trajectory and her requests for
block safety indexes never leave her phone and (ii) performance – frequent block
safety index requests are performed locally, while infrequent census block safety
index updates are performed periodically to ensure an accurate copy of the device’s
cache.
Whenever a user starts the iSafe app, iSafe retrieves the user’s current geoloca-
tion, derives the current census block and also the corresponding crime index. iSafe
stores the user’s trajectory as one record [block, time, crime index] in the SQLite
database. The initial threshold values for creating a new record are 60 seconds. iSafe
uses an exponential backoff algorithm [KSM05] coupled with accelerometer data to
ensure that a static device does not consume battery power on GPS queries. iSafe
updates then the user’s current crime index and vicinity crime values.
iSafe uses Bluetooth [SIG01] to compute the vicinity crime metrics for the user’s
neighbors. We implemented a client-server Bluetooth communication protocol where
each device acts as a server and other connected devices act as clients per P2P
communication. Bluetooth is a packet-based protocol with a master-slave structure
in which one master may communicate with up to 7 slaves in a piconet [SIG01].
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Figure 4.13: iSafe browser plugin overhead: Collecting reviews from venues, as a
function of the number of reviews.
iSafe has a separate background service that displays the status bar of the An-
droid device, the safety color label of the user’s current location. Figures 4.12a
and 4.12b show snapshots of iSafe’s functionality.
4.8 Experimental Evaluation
4.8.1 Browser Plugin Performance
Figure 4.13 shows the overhead of the iSafe plugin when collecting the reviews of a
venue browsed by the user, as a function of the number of reviews the venue has.
It includes the cost to request each review page, parse and process the data for
transfer. The experiments were performed on the Dell laptop. It exhibits a sub-
linear dependence on the number of reviews of the venue (under 1s for 10 reviews
but under 30s for 4000 reviews), showing that Yelp’s delay for successive requests
decreases. While even for 500 reviews the overhead is less than 5s, we note that
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Figure 4.14: Crime Forecasting Experiments in Miami-Dade
this cost is incurred only once per venue. Subsequent accesses to the same venue,
by any other user will no longer incur this overhead.
4.8.2 Forecasting Accuracy
We explore here the performance of the time series forecasting techniques discussed
in Section 4.2.3 in predicting the number of crimes to occur at a location during the
near future, based on the recorded history.
We used the R statistical software package [R D11] to generate the ARIMA
model and MATLAB toolboxes [MAT10] for LES and ANN models. In the fol-
lowing, we analyze separately three crime types, aggravated assault, robbery and
larceny/theft that make up for more than 75% of the total amount of crimes. As we
show later in this section, predicting categorized event counts enables the prediction
of future safety values.
In the first experiment we used crime data recorded between 2007 and 2010 to
predict per-month categorized event counts for the year 2011, for the entire Miami-
Dade county.
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Figure 4.15: Crime Forecasting Experiments in Miami-Dade
Figure 4.14a compares the predictions for the number of assaults made by
ARIMA, LES and ANN against the recorded values. Table 4.2 shows the RMSE
and MAPE values for the three methods. All three models correctly predict the
downward trend from May until December, with ANN achieving a slightly better
accuracy than LES and ARIMA.
Figure 4.14b compares the predictions for the number of robberies made by
ARIMA, LES and ANN against the recorded values. All models accurately predict
the initial increase followed by a slight decrease in the number of robberies. ARIMA
and ANN outperform the LES model, as confirmed by the RSME and MAPE values
(see Table 4.2). ARIMA slightly outperforms ANN.
We further focus on finer grained spatial and temporal predictions: per-block,
weekly events. For ANN, we partition the input data into 95 training vectors and
10 test vectors. Figure 4.15a compares the recorded data against the ARIMA,
LES and ANN predictions of assault events in the last ten weeks of 2011, for one
block in the Miami-Dade county. We emphasize the accuracy of the prediction
(see Table 4.2), which is similar for ANN and ARIMA. Finally, we focus on daily
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Figure 4.14a Figure 4.14b Figure 4.15a Figure 4.15b
Model RMSE MAPE RMSE MAPE RMSE MAPE RMSE MAPE
ARIMA 158.80 6.42 38.77 7.08 1.27 43 1.57 34.52
LES 151.03 6.79 53.57 11.89 1.41 42.08 1.61 30.07
ANN 116.48 5.32 40.44 8.23 1.3 35.72 1.49 27.02
Table 4.2: Error measurement data for ARIMA, LES and ANN.
crime predictions. For the same block used in the previous experiment, using a time
window of events recorded between Jan 1, 2010 and Nov 30, 2011, we predict the 31
days of December 2011. Figure 4.15b shows the comparison between the recorded
data and the ARIMA, LES and ANN forecast, for the daily number of larceny/theft
events.
Experiment conclusions. ANN slightly outperforms ARIMA and LES, but all
models exhibit good accuracy - except for the unexpected zero crime incidents ob-
served during a couple of days. Intuitively, using predicted, future values for the
number of crimes to define the safety of a block leads to more accurate values than
using a static approach.
4.8.3 Yelp Safety Profiles
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We have collected public information from the accounts of 2025 Yelp users, all
residents of the Miami-Dade county. The information collected for each user includes
the number of reviews, the venues reviewed, existing check-ins at any venues, and
the date when each review and check-in was recorded. We build the crime index, CI,
value for each Census block from the Miami-Dade county in 2010. Figure 4.16 shows
the cumulative distribution function of the CI values (Figure 4.6 shows their spatial
distribution). It shows that for the Miami-Dade county, most blocks experience
relatively low levels of crime per-capita: 50% of blocks have a CI value smaller than
0.0015 and only 5% of blocks have CI values exceeding 0.01.
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Figure 4.17: Distribution of safety index values of Yelp users.
Given the CI values of the blocks containing the venues visited (reviewed or
subject of a check-in) by a yelper (Yelp user), we compute the user’s crime index
value, as defined by Equation 4.4, then the user’s safety index: SIU = 1 − CIU .
Out of the 2025 collected yelpers, 1194 had written reviews in 2010. Figure 4.17
shows the distribution of the safety index values of these 1194 yelpers. It shows that
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most Miami-Dade county yelpers are safe: all have a safety index value larger than
0.96 (1 is the maximum value), with 90% of them exceeding 0.99.
We further compare the evolution in time of the safety index SIB of a block B
with the average safety index values over the Yelp users that visited B (and left
feedback). To this end, based on the crime database, for each month we calculate
the SI value of each block in the Miami-Dade county. We then compute the monthly
average of safety index values of yelpers that reviewed venues within B (during the
month). Figure 4.18 shows the monthly evolution of the SIB value of a Miami-Dade
block and the average safety index value of the Yelp users that visited the block
during 2010. For this block, the two metrics have similar values. This shows that
an average of the safety indexes of the block’s visitors can be used to replace a
crime-based safety index for the block.
4.8.4 Android iSafe Evaluation
We have created a testbed consisting of 4 Android smartphones: Samsung Admire
(OS: Gingerbread 2.3.4), HTC Aria (OS: Eclair 2.1), Sony E10i (OS: Eclair 2.1) and
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Samsung GALAXY S II (OS: Gingerbread 2.3.4). We used Shamir’s secret sharing
solution. For single device testing, we used the Samsung Admire smartphone with a
800MHz CPU. In the following, all reported values are averages taken over at least
10 independent protocol runs.
We have first measured the overhead of the secret share generation and recon-
struction operation. Figure 4.19a shows the overhead on the smartphone, when the
modulus size ranges from 64 to 1024 bits. Note that even a resource constrained
smartphone takes only 4.5 ms and 16 ms for secret splitting and reconstruction even
for 1024 bit long moduli.
Furthermore, we focus on the time and space communication overhead for a single
device as well as for the 4 connected devices in our testbed. Figure 4.19b shows the
dependence of the communication time on the modulus bit size. Even for modulus
size of 1024 bits, the average end-to-end communication overhead of a single device
is 342ms and 1.3s of our whole system. Figure 4.19c shows the dependency of the
communication overhead (in KB) on the modulus size ranging from 64 to 1024 bits,
for a single device and for the whole system of 4 connected devices. Even for 1024
bit moduli, the total communication overhead is around 3KB.
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CHAPTER 5
FILTERING FAKE INFORMATION IN LOCATION BASED
SERVICES
In this chapter, we focus on detecting fraudulent information in review centered
GSNs, such as Yelp and its ability to provide correct data. Specifically, we focus on
malicious campaigns that aim to bias the public image of represented businesses in
LBSs through the use of fake reviews. This chapter presents SpiDeR, an algorithm
that takes advantage of the richness of information available in Yelp to detect re-
view campaigns as venues exhibiting abnormal review patterns. We also leverage
geolocation data and SpsJoin to detect fake venues that allow us to define a much
richer ground truth dataset and to evaluate our results.
Acknowledgements. I would like to acknowledge Mr. Mahmudur Rahman. He
contributed to specific parts shown in this chapter and gave valuable insights. In
Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4, he helped in collecting Yelp Event and ground truth data
respectively. In Section 5.4.1, he evaluated the Hampel identifier and wrote source
code for the browser plugin in the WatchYT application (Section 5.5). He currently
maintains the website of the WatchYT project.
5.1 Introduction
Geosocial networks (GSNs) such as Yelp [Yel] and Foursquare [fou] extend review-
centered sites (e.g., Amazon [Ama], TripAdvisor [Tri]) with social and geographic
dimensions. Subscribers own accounts where they store public profiles, use them to
befriend and maintain contact with other users and provide feedback, in the form
of reviews, for visited venues.
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Since the impact of the occasional fraudulent review is likely to be minimized by
many honest reviews, we focus here on review campaigns : entities that hire groups
of people to write fake reviews and bias public opinion.
Previous work on TripAdvisor [YG09, OCCH11], focuses on identifying patterns
in the text of fake reviews. Instead, our main goal is to increase the difficulty and
thus the financial cost required to launch successful review campaigns. To achieve
our goal we rely on Yelp’s unique combination of geolocation and social components.
This chapter investigates techniques for detecting review campaigns. We col-
lected publicly available data from Yelp using our own data crawler mechanism.
Our experiments prove that detection techniques currently employed by Yelp can
be bypassed, as we were able to engineer tens of reviews that were not filtered.
We first exploit relations between a user’s location and those of the venues she
and her friends review, to define a user rating. We introduce SpiDeR , an algorithm
that detects review campaigns by identifying spikes generated by low rated reviewers.
We note that our contributions complement and are further motivated by the
work of Byers et al. [BMZ12]. Byers et al. [BMZ12] argue that Yelp reviews mention-
ing Groupon may be low, due to other reviews being artificially high from actions
taken by businesses. Our goal is precisely to identify such artificial reviews.
When tested on more than 16,000 venues with over a 1 million reviews we col-
lected from Yelp, SpiDeR shows that spikes generated by low rated reviewers are
frequent: we have identified hundreds of venues likely to have been the target of re-
view campaigns. Furthermore, We explore a special form of campaign: Yelp Events.
We collected data from different Yelp events and analyze the short and long term
impact they have in the rating of venues. Our experiments show that there is a
statistically significant dependency between number of reviews and the long and
short term impact.
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We tested SpiDeR on ground truth data extracted both from our review cam-
paign experiments and from 27,622 reviews filtered by Yelp from 2,718 venues. This
enabled us to not only experimentally set SpiDeR parameters but also to establish
the novelty of our approach: Yelp does not detect review spikes generated by low
rated reviewers.
Finally, when tested on data collected from more than 10,000 Yelp users, we were
able to detect more than 150 users (1.5%) that took part in at least two campaigns
and even several users who participated in more than 10 campaigns. This shows
that while most Yelp users are honest, review campaigns are not isolated incidents.
5.2 System Model
Yelp [Yel] hosts the system, consisting of (i) information about venues, representing
businesses or events with an associated location, e.g., restaurants, shops, offices,
concerts, etc, and (ii) user accounts. Users can register and receive initial service
credentials, including a unique user id. Yelp also supports queries from users, reg-
istering more than 70 million unique visitors per month [Wik12].
Reviews provided by users for venues have a numerical component, a rating
ranging from 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest mark. Yelp associates an average rating
value for each venue, computed over all the ratings of reviews left by users. Users
can further leave pre-defined feedback for other reviews, by clicking on “useful”,
“funny” or “cool” buttons.
Yelp rewards “influential” reviewers with a special, yearly “Elite” badge. The
reviews of Elite yelpers are often given priority when shown on a venue’s page. Yelp
also organizes “events” for Elite yelpers. Such events are hosted by a venue (chosen
by Yelp) and a Yelp page is generated for this event.
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5.2.1 Yelp Data
Data Collection
The crawler. We have developed a crawling engine to automatically collect data
from Yelp’s user and venue pages. The crawler uses a resource pool (see Figure 5.1)
consisting of a set of servers and a set of proxies. For every request, the crawler
randomly picks a server from the server pool and pairs it with a proxy from the
proxy pool. The request is then made from the server, through the proxy. For each
successful request, the crawler fetches the raw HTML page from Yelp and parses the
required information. If the request is not successful, a new request is made using a
different proxy. A centralized scheduler maintains a request queue to ensure there
are no loops in the crawling process, i.e., avoids crawling the same page multiple
times if referenced from several sources. When Yelp picks an anomalous proxy, any
request made from this IP will return a blank HTML page or a page with error.
Our crawler automatically detects this and changes the proxy. Furthermore, to
minimize the load on Yelp’s servers, and avoid detection, we introduce long inter-
request intervals.
Crawling Yelp. In order to collect a representative sample of Yelp data, we used
stratified sampling [TD00]. First, we selected a list of 10 major cities in the U.S.
and we collected an initial random list of 100 venues from each of these cities as
a seed dataset. It is important to understand that our strata (cities) are mutually
111
exclusive, i.e. venues do not belong to two or more different cities. This way we avoid
bias towards high degree nodes, which is a common problem when crawling social
networks [GKBM10]. We then randomly selected 10,031 Yelp users who reviewed
these venues, and collected their data, including their id, location, number of friends
and all their reviews, for a total of 646,017 reviews.
Given the list of 10,031 collected Yelp users, we merged the lists of the venues
reviewed by those users (to avoid duplicate venues) and we randomly selected 16,199
venues, including venues from cities outside the U.S. (e.g., London, U.K, Vancouver,
CA, etc). For each venue we have collected its name, location and type, along with
all the reviews received, for a total of 1,096,044 reviews. For each review we extracted
the reviewer id, the date the review was written, the number of check-ins performed
and the photos uploaded by the reviewer at the venue, as well as feedback received
by the review itself (number of users who thought the review was “useful”, “funny”
or “cool”).
Figure 5.2a shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the number
of reviews per user. While only 20% of users have more than 100 reviews, the
record user has 4,000 reviews. Figure 5.2b shows the CDF of the number of friends
per user. Only 15% of users have no friends but 50% of users have more than
10 friends. Furthermore, Figure 5.2c shows the percentage of reviews that have
associated photos, check-ins and user feedback. While 15% of reviews have an
associated check-in, a respectable 46% of reviews have been labeled as “useful”.
This shows that Yelp is an active social network, whose users widely embrace its
rich features.
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Figure 5.2: Yelp user stats.
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5.2.2 Yelp Events
Yelp rewards users that write popular reviews with a special, Elite badge status.
The Elite badge is awarded to users who not only write many reviews and have
many friends, but whose reviews receive significant recognition (e.g., feedback) from
other users. The reviews of Elite yelpers are never filtered and are often shown at
the beginning of a venue’s Yelp page.
Yelp organizes special Elite events, at select venues, where only Elite badge
holders are invited. For each event, Yelp creates a separate Yelp page, containing
the name of the event and the name, address and information for the hosting venue.
Attendees are encouraged to review the event account, which then lists the reviews,
just like a regular venue.
5.2.3 Yelp Event Collection
We have collected Yelp events from 60 major cities covering 44 states of USA. The
remaining states had no significant Yelp events or activities (WY, VT, SD, NE,
WV, ND). After identifying an Elite event, we identified the hosting venue through
either its name or address. We used the crawler previously described to collect a
majority of the available Yelp events and hosting venues, for a total of 149 pairs.
For each Yelp event and corresponding venue, we have collected their name,
number of reviews, star rating and all their reviews. For each review, we have
collected the date when it was written, the rating given and the available information
about the reviewer, including the Elite status, number of friends and number of
reviews written. In total, we have collected 24,054 event/hosting venue reviews.
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5.2.4 Ground Truth Data Collection
As part of our procedure to build a ground truth to validate our results, we manually
collected fake data. Our collection process started by identify fake venues that were
flagged by Yelp users in the Yelp Talk service. We also picked yelpers that had fake
photos (collected from Google Images) or things that looked suspicious. While most
of the reviewers have no friends and a majority only wrote one review, we were able
to collect several users with more than 100 reviews and 20 friends.
Yelp filtered reviews. We have collected the reviews filtered by Yelp from 2,718
of our venue dataset, for a total of 27,622 filtered reviews. Since Yelp uses captchas
to protect the access of filtered reviews, we created a tool that queries Yelp in the
background, extracts the captcha and displays it to a captcha solver (a human)
through a GUI. The captcha solver attempts to solve the challenge and submits
the answer. If successful, the software leverages the current session to download
all reviews that were unlocked by the CAPTCHA solver. For each filtered review,
we have collected information about the review writer, such as number of friends
and number of reviews, the location of the writer and if the user is currently an
elite member of Yelp. Figure 5.3a shows the distribution of the number of reviews
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written by the writers of filtered reviews and Figure 5.3b shows the distribution of
the number of friends of those users. They show that 87% of the writers of filtered
reviews have at most 4 friends and 67% have written at most 4 reviews. We will
use these findings to define the notion of user ratings (see Section 5.3).
5.3 User and Venue Analysis
In this section we investigate spatial and temporal dimensions of information con-
tained in user accounts and exploit our findings to introduce user ratings.
Spatial dimension. We focus first on the per-user clusters of locations of reviewed
venues: locations where a user tends to write more reviews. Figure 5.4a shows the
distribution of the number of cities where the collected users wrote reviews. 80%
of users wrote reviews in less than 20 cities. However, several users exceed 300
cities, reaching as far as 378 cities. Then, should we expect a user to write most
of her reviews in her home city? Figure 5.4b shows the CDF of the percentage of
reviews written by the collected users in their most frequented city. It shows that
as expected, 23% of users have almost all their reviews in the same city (the spike
at the end of the curve) and 60% of users have more than a quarter of their reviews
in the same city. Users that have a small percentage of their reviews in their most
frequented city are likely to have reviewed venues in many cities.
Then, Figure 5.4c shows the average (and corresponding 95% confidence inter-
vals) number of cities where a user writes reviews, as a function of the number of
reviews written by the user. Excluding the users with more than 425 reviews, the
plot shows a sublinear increase in the number of cities. Venues reviewed by users
with 400-425 reviews are in less than 70 cities, whereas those of users with more
than 425 reviews are in more than 110 cities.
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Figure 5.4: Statistics of User Reviews
117
Figure 5.5: Geographic distribution of venues with more than 4 Yelp reviews, in
Miami-Dade county, FL.
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Our Yelp-Fakes experiment shows that no reviews were written by locals, i.e.,
users whose home city coincides with the reviewed venue’s city. Then, in a second
investigation, we have collected all the 7,699 venues registered in the Miami-Dade
(FL) county; Figure 5.5 shows the geographic distribution of these venues, shown
as small dots whose color represents the percentage of reviews from locals vs. the
total number of reviews received by the venues. Red dots represent venues with
many visitors (few locals) and green venues represent venues with few visitors. The
plot only shows data from the subset of 4418 venues that registered more than 4
reviews. While venues around Miami Beach and the airports justifiably experience
more visitors, we note that several venues in the western and southern parts of the
county stand out - reds surrounded by greens. We exploit this observation in the
definition of SpiDeR .
User timelines and ratings. We use the results of the above experiments to
define the notion of user ratings. First, however, we introduce the helper notion of
user timelines:
Definition 5.3.1 (User Timeline) Let HU = {(Vi, Ri, R¯i, Ti)|i = 1..h} denote the
timeline of a user U , a set of tuples, ordered by their timestamp Ti, where Vi is
a venue reviewed by U and Ri is the rating assigned at time Ti, when the venue’s
average rating is R¯i. Furthermore, let AHU = {(Vi, Ri, R¯i, Ti|Ri 6= 0 ∧ R¯i 6= 0, i =
1..ha} be the active timeline of user U , the subset of HU containing only non-neutral
reviews of U provided for non-neutral venues (whose average rating is not 3).
We consider three rating types: positive (Ri = 1, for a star rating of 4 or 5),
negative (Ri = −1, for a star rating of 1 or 2) and neutral (Ri = 0, 3 star rating
reviews). R¯i, the average rating of Vi at time Ti, can also take one of three values:
-1 if the average rating of venue Vi is below 3, 0 if equal to 3, and +1 if above
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We rely on user timelines to introduce user ratings, a metric for differentiating
dishonest from honest users. A high rating denotes an active user, with expertise
in the areas reviewed and that has review active friends. We exploit the conclusion
of Figure 5.4c to define the expertise ExpV of a user U for a reviewed venue V , to
be ExpV = cV /ha, where cV is the number of reviews written by U in the vicinity
of V , not counting the review at V , and ha = |AHU |, is the number of active
reviews of U (see Definition 5.3.1). We define the vicinity of a venue to be the circle
centered at the location of the venue having a predefined radius (e.g., 50 miles in
our experiments).
Let f0 denote the number of friends of a user U that have at least Tr reviews.
We define the rating of user U , combining U ’s spatial and temporal dimensions, to
be:
RU =
 0, if (h < Tr ∧ f0 < Tf )∑hai=1 sgn(|Ri+R¯i|)Expi
ha
, otherwise
(5.1)
where Tr and Tf are threshold variables whose values we discuss later, sgn is the
sign function and Expi is U ’s expertise for the i-th reviewed venue. sgn(|Ri + R¯i|)
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can only be 0 or 1. Thus, the rating of a user is defined to be 0 if the user has
written less than Tr reviews and has less than Tf friends with at least Tr reviews
each. This is suggested by the results of Figure 5.3a, Figure 5.3b.
Otherwise, the user’s rating is a weighted average (over the length of its active
history) of the user’s concordance with her reviewed venues’ average rating: if the
venue and the user review both have either a positive or negative rating, the user’s
rating is incremented. The weight associated with a review is higher if the user has
reviewed other close-by venues. We observe that RU ∈ [0, 1].
5.4 Detecting Review Campaigns
High user ratings seem to indicate honest users: well connected users, that write
many clustered reviews, with ratings not going against the grain, are less likely to
be malicious. However, by itself, this metric is not sufficient for detecting review
campaigns. First, it suffers from a cold-start problem, as honest new users will likely
have low ratings. Second, our Yelp-Fakes experiment shows that with additional
effort, ratings can be engineered. Instead, in this section we propose efficient review
campaign detection techniques that significantly raise the effort bar and thus the
financial cost required to launch successful campaigns.
We first introduce the notion of venue timelines:
Definition 5.4.1 (Venue Timeline) The timeline of a venue V is the set of tuples
HV = {(Ui, Ri, Ti)|i = 1..v}, the chronological succession of reviews Ri written for
V by users Ui at time Ti.
Figure 5.7 illustrates the venue timeline concept. Figure 5.7a shows the evolution
in time of the number of negative reviews (1 and 2 star) and Figure 5.7b shows the
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Figure 5.7: Venues timeline
evolution in time of the number of positive reviews (4 and 5 star) for a venue called
“Ike’s Place” in San Francisco, CA [IKE], whose first review was registered in 2008.
The number of daily negative reviews ranges between 0 and 3, and, with a total
of 3,169 positive reviews in 1,220 active days, the number of daily positive reviews
averages 2.59. However, on Nov. 7, 2011 (a Monday), the venue records a spike of
78 positive reviews. We propose then to detect such abnormal reviewing activities
by analyzing venue timelines.
5.4.1 Review Spikes
We exploit the observation that in order for a review campaign to have an impact on
the aggregate rating of a subject, it needs to contain a sufficient numbers of reviews.
Such reviews, taken over an adequate time interval (days, weeks or months), will
then stand out. We investigate the use of several techniques for retrieving ranges of
abnormal reviewing activity, spikes or outliers in a venue’s timeline.
Box-and-Whisker plots We first propose the use of measures of dispersion of
Box-and-Whisker plots [TD00], consisting of, quartiles and interquartile ranges
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(IQRs), to detect outliers. The idea is the following. Given a venue V , we first
compute the quartiles and the IQR of the positive reviews from V ’s timeline HV
(negative reviews are handled similarly). We then compute the upper outer fence
(UOF ) value using the Box-Whiskers plot [TD00]. For each day d during V ’s active
period, let Pd denote the set of positive reviews from HV written during day d. If
|Pd| > UOF , we output Pd, i.e., a spike has been detected. For instance, the afore-
mentioned Ike’s Place has a UOF of 9 for positive reviews: any day with more than
9 positive reviews is considered to be a spike. The advantages of this approach are
that (i) it makes no distributional assumptions and it does not depend on a mean
or standard deviation and (ii) its use of quartiles makes it less sensitive to extreme
values.
Hampel Identifier The interquartile based approach however may not be ade-
quate for a small sample size [IH93], such as venues that only have reviews during a
small number of days. For such venues we propose an alternative approach. Given a
venue V , we first compute the median and the MAD (Median Absolute Deviation)
scale [Ham71] standard deviation S of the positive reviews for V (negative reviews
are handled similarly). Then, we detect the outlier reviews using Hampel’s identi-
fier [HRRS86]: Set the threshold point TP for V as t× S where t is the dispersion
value and typically 2 ≤ t ≤ 5 (set to 4 in our experiments). For each day d during
V ’s active period, let Pd denote the set of positive reviews from HV recorded during
d. If |Pd| > TP , output Pd.
5.4.2 SpiDeR
We now propose SpiDeR (Spike Detection Ranges), an algorithm that identifies
review campaigns by combining detected review spikes with user ratings. Instead
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Algorithm 3 SpiDeR : Fake review
campaign detection.
1.campaign[]SpiDeR (V : venue, HV : history)
2. spikes[]; #list of spikes
3. RevS[] : Review; #reviews ∈ spike
4. US[] : User; #review writers
5. campaign[]; #review campaigns
6. Ts, wr, Tp : float; #threshold values
7. spikes := detectSpikes(HV);
8. for s := 1 to spikes.size do
9. RevS := getReviews(spikes[s]);
10. if (RevS.size < Ts) then continue; fi
11. US := getReviewers(RevS);
12. counter := 0;
13. for u := 1 to US.size do
14. U := US[u];
15. if (U.rating < wr & U.city 6= V.city) then
16. counter := counter + 1;
17. fi od
18. if (counter/US.size > Tp) then
19. campaign.add(spikes[s]); fi
20. od
21. return campaign[]
22.end
of flagging all review spikes as suspicious, SpiDeR carefully analyzes each review
that is part of a spike: it counts the number of reviews in each spike written by
users with low ratings and flags as suspicious only spikes made up by more than a
threshold of low quality reviews.
Algorithm 3 shows SpiDeR ’s steps, taking as arguments a venue and its timeline.
First, it uses the abnormal behavior detection techniques of Section 5.4 to identify
spikes in the number of either positive or negative reviews received by the venue
(Algorithm 3 line 7). Each spike is processed separately (lines 8-20). For each
spike, SpiDeR retrieves its component reviews and ignores the spike if the number
of reviews is below a threshold TS (lines 9-10). In our experiments we focus on
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Figure 5.8: The timeline of “Pink Taco 2” (Los Angeles) and of the Yelp event for
this venue. Note the correlation between the two.
day-long spikes and set TS to twice the average number of daily reviews recorded
by the venue.
Otherwise, for each reviewer who created one of those reviews (lines 11-14),
SpiDeR marks her review as suspicious if (i) her rating (see Section 5.3) is below
a threshold wr and (ii) her city differs from the venue’s city (lines 15-16). If the
percentage of suspicious reviews in the spike exceeds another threshold Tp, Spi-
DeR marks the spike as a review campaign (lines 18-19). SpiDeR returns the list
of identified campaigns (line 21). We evaluate SpiDeR in Section 5.5.3 and propose
values for the parameters introduced here.
SpiDeR uses a range tree [Lue78] data structure to identify spikes in a time
range. The range trees allows SpiDeR to aggregate spikes that are deemed to be
suspicious in up to one week.
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5.4.3 Yelp Events = Review Campaigns?
We introduce the hypothesis that Yelp events are a special type of review campaigns:
Yelp selects the hosting venue, notifies the venue owners sufficiently in advance so
they can ensure a good experience for their customers and allows only Elite yelpers
to attend. Yelp creates a separate Yelp page for the event, where the attendees are
encouraged to write the reviews of their experience of the event [Yel09]. While the
declared goal of the event venues is to prevent unfairness to venues that do not host
events, we study the impact of events on the venues hosting them. The question we
ask is whether Elite events help improve the short and long term venue ratings. If
such events have a positive effect, we believe they can be used as an alternative to
fake reviews.
Our approach relies on the notion of positive venue timelines : the evolution
in time of the number of daily positive reviews received by a venue. We use the
venue timeline to identify abnormally high numbers of positive reviews received by
the venue within a short time interval. This enables us to mark spikes that occur
within a short timeframe of an event hosted by the venue, by using SpiDeR . We
then compute the impact of the event on the venue, as the difference between the
average rating of the venue at a given time following the event and its rating before
the event.
Figure 5.8 shows a different type of correlation, for the venue “Pink Taco 2”
located in Los Angeles. It displays the venue’s timeline and the timeline of the
Yelp page associated with the Yelp event. We emphasize that the venue’s latest two
spikes coincide with the spikes of the event. We study the effects of Yelp Elite events,
organized for the benefit of Elite reviewers, on the image of the hosting venues. To
this end, we introduce WatchYT, a tool for identifying venues receiving abnormally
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Algorithm 4 WatchYT: Yelp cam-
paign detection tool.
1.WatchYT(events[] : YelpEvent, ∆T : Time)
2. campaings[]; #campaigns detected
3. campaigns := newVenue[];
4. for i := 0 to events.size() do
5. YelpEvent e := events[i];
6. Date eDate := e.getDate();
7. Venue V := e.getVenue();
8. Timeline HV := V.getTimeline();
9. TimeRange[] spikes := SpiKeR(HV);
10. if (spikes.correlated(eDate, ∆T)) then
11. campaigns.add(V); fi
12. od
13 return campaings;
large numbers of reviews in a short time and use them to detect correlations between
events and hosting venues. We evaluate our results in Section 5.5.2.
WatchYT: event/spike correlations. We introduce WatchYT (Watch Yelp
Timelines), an algorithm that relies on SpiDeR to detect correlations between Yelp
events and increased review activity concerning the venues hosting the events. Al-
gorithm 4 shows the pseudocode of the approach. Specifically, given a set of Yelp
events (events) and a time interval ∆T (system parameter), WatchYT determines
the set of venues that benefit from an event within an interval ∆T of the event’s
date. WatchYT processes each Yelp event separately (lines 4-12). It first retrieves
the date of the event, as representing the date when the first review was written
for the event (line 6). It then retrieves the venue hosting the event (line 7), collects
its reviews and reconstructs its timeline (line 8). WatchYT runs SpiDeR to detect
abnormal review behavior over the timeline (line 9). If a spike occurs within an
interval ∆T from the date of the event (line 10), it adds the venue to the list of
detected campaigns (line 11).
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5.5 Experimental Evaluation
WatchYT Implementation We have prototyped SpiDeR as part of a system
we call WatchYT (Watch Yelp Timelines), that we made publicly available [WAT].
WatchYT consists of two components, a web server and a browser extension running
in the user’s browser. We use Apache Tomcat 6.0.35 to route requests (exposed to
the client through a REST interface) to our server-side component. The server-
side component relies on the latest servlet v3.0 which offers additional features
including asynchronous support, making the server-side processing more efficient.
We implemented the browser extension for the Chrome browser using HTML, CSS
and Javascript. The plugin interacts with Yelp pages and the web server, using
content scripts (Chrome specific components that let us access the browser’s native
API) and cross-origin XMLHttpRequests. If our content script receives content from
another web site, it inspects it for cross-site scripting attacks before injecting the
content into the current page (e.g., to protect the user from a hijack attack). To
store and process review and user data for each venue, we use the SQLite 3.7.12.1
as the DB server.
The browser plugin becomes active when the user navigates to a Yelp page.
For venue pages, the plugin parses their HTML file and retrieves their reviews.
We employ a stateful approach, where the server’s DB stores all reviews of venues
previously accessed by users. This enables significant time savings, as the plugin
needs to send to the web server only reviews written after the date of the last user’s
access to the venue’s page. The initial access to a venue is likely to be slower,
requiring the plugin to access multiple pages of reviews. Given the venue’s timeline,
the web server runs SpiDeR to identify any fake review campaigns. The server sends
back details of any identified campaigns to the user’s browser plugin, which includes
128
Figure 5.9: Snapshot of WatchYT ’s plugin functionality for the venue “Ike’s Place”.
it in the browser. Figure 5.9 shows the output of WatchYT for the venue “Ike’s
Place”. We note also that this approach may cause the user to be blocked from
Yelp if several reviews are necessary to collect long history. This is specifically the
case of venues that have lots of reviews.
We have evaluated the overhead of WatchYT in real deployments. Figure 5.10a
shows the overhead of WatchYT when collecting the reviews of a venue browsed by
the user, as a function of the number of reviews the venue has. It includes the cost to
request each review page, parse and process the data for transfer. The experiments
were performed on a Dell laptop equipped with a 2.4GHz Intel Core i5 processor
and 4GB of RAM. It exhibits a sub-linear dependence on the number of reviews of
the venue (under 1s for 10 reviews but under 30s for 4000 reviews). This is because
Yelp’s delay for successive requests on the same venue page decreases. While even
for 500 reviews the overhead is less than 5s, we note that this cost is incurred only
once per venue. Subsequent accesses to the same venue, by any other user will no
longer incur this overhead.
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Figure 5.10: WatchYT overheads
Furthermore, we have implemented the server-side SpiDeR using Java. Fig-
ure 5.10b shows the overhead of SpiDeR running on the same Dell laptop, as a
function of the number of reviews. Even for 4000 reviews the overhead of detecting
review spikes is less than 11ms.
5.5.1 Spike Detection Evaluation
We now investigate the effectiveness of the review spike detection tools described in
Section 5.4.1. Figure 5.11a shows the output of the Box-and-Whisker plot detection
technique (see Section 5.4) when applied to the positive reviews of the 16,199 venues
collected across the U.S.: the distribution of the amplitude (the number of reviews)
of the spikes detected. It shows that the amplitude has a long-tail distribution. The
aforementioned Ike’s Place has the spike with the highest amplitude - 78 positive
reviews in one day. Several spikes correspond to Yelp events. Figure 5.11b shows
the output of the Hampel identifier technique when applied to the same venues.
While the Hampel identifier detects significantly fewer small spikes than the Box-
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Figure 5.11: Performance of Outlier Detection Techiniques
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Figure 5.12: Yelp events: Spike count as a function of ∆T .
and-Whisker plot technique, it is able to detect a similar number of higher amplitude
spikes (e.g., consisting of more than 20 reviews).
We have also used Box-and-Whisker plots to identify negative review spikes.
Figure 5.11c shows the distribution of the number of reviews per negative spike.
While we identified fewer negative spikes, they are more consistent than the positive
ones, e.g., the “626 Asian Night Market” with 140 negative reviews.
5.5.2 An Analysis of Yelp Events
To validate our hypothesis that Yelp events are a special type of review campaigns,
we have used the Box-and-Whisker approach to identify the impact of Yelp events on
the hosting venue. Specifically, for each Yelp event we collected (see Section 5.2.1),
we mark the corresponding hosting venue that has a spike occurring within a pre-
defined interval ∆T after the date of the event.
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Figure 5.13: Yelp events: Distribution of the immediate impact of Yelp events on
the venues’ ratings.
Figure 5.12 shows the dependence between the spikes detected by the Box-and-
Whiskers approach and the size of ∆T , ranging from 1 to 5 weeks. For instance,
when ∆T is 14 days, we were able to detect 36 spikes on the 149 venues – in the
2 weeks following the event. Some venues had more than one spike within those
14 days. The total number of venues with at least one spike is 24, accounting for
around 17% of the venues. Furthermore, Figure 5.13 shows the short term impact of
a Yelp event on the hosting venue. We define the impact as the difference between
the average rating of a venue 2 weeks after the event and its rating before the event.
Almost twice as many venues benefit from Yelp events, when compared to those
negatively impacted by it.
Furthermore, to understand the long term impact of Yelp events, we compared
the current ratings of the 149 venues with their ratings before the events. Figure 5.17
shows the distribution (over the 149 venues) of the difference between the current
rating and the rating before the events. While we see a balance between the number
of venues showing an improvement versus a negative impact (16 positive vs. 14
negative) we note that the negative impact is only half a star. The positive impact
reaches up to 3.5 stars!
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Figure 5.14: Yelp events. Distribution of the improvement due to events.
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Figure 5.16: Dependency between the short term rating change of venues due to
events and their number of reviews. Importance given by standardized residuals.
To validate these results, we have used the data of the 16,199 venues we have
collected (see Section 5.2.1). We have filtered out venues exhibiting less than 30
reviews, leaving us with 5,691 venues. For each venue, we simulated an event as
taking place at the median of the (149) Yelp events above. Then, we computed the
average rating of the venue at the simulated event and subtracted it from the current
rating of the venue. The distribution of the difference is shown in Figure 5.15. We
note that twice as many venues show a negative impact vs. an improvement. Thus,
these results suggest that Yelp events may pay off: venues that host events are more
likely to experience a rating boost than a rating cut.
We then study the possibility of a relation between the number of reviews of a
venue and the short term impact an event has on the venue. We observe that the
impact of an event is quantified with fractions of rating, which means that we are
dealing with a categorical variable. Therefore, we cannot use methods for linear or
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Figure 5.17: Yelp events: Distribution of the improvement due to events
non-linear association, e.g. correlation coefficient. Instead, we tested the hypothesis
of independence, using a χ2 test [TD00], between the rating impact and the number
of reviews, a discrete variable. The test gave us a χ2 = 58.6837 with 36 degrees of
freedom, which is highly significant with a p-value of 0.009854. Thus, we reject the
hypothesis of independence.
Figure 5.16 shows the mosaic plot depicting this relation. Each rectangle cor-
responds to a set of venues, that have a certain review count range (the x axis)
and having been impacted by a certain measure within two weeks of an event (the
y axis). The shape and size of each rectangle depict the contribution of the cor-
responding variables, so a large rectangle means a large count in the contingency
table. Blue rectangles indicate that they are more than two standard deviations
above the expected counts. Then, the figure shows that more than half of the (149)
venues have more than 40 reviews. Moreover, we notice that the venues having more
than 40 reviews set the trend of Figure 5.13: while roughly one third of the venues
show no impact, twice as many venues show a positive impact vs. a negative one.
We now focus on the long term impact of Yelp events. For this, we compare the
current ratings of the 149 venues with their ratings before the events. Figure 5.17
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Figure 5.18: Dependency between the long term rating change of venues due to
events and their number of reviews.
shows the distribution (over the 149 venues) of the difference between the current
rating of the venues and their rating before the events. 78% of venues show no
improvement. Furthermore, we see a balance between the number of venues showing
an improvement versus a negative impact (16 positive vs. 14 negative). However,
we emphasize that the negative impact is only half a star, while the positive impact
reaches up to 3.5 stars.
We conduct a χ2 test to verify the dependence of the long term impact of events
on venues on the number of ratings of the venues. The test was highly significant
with χ2 = 29.2038, 12 degrees of freedom and a p-value of 0.003674. Figure 5.18
shows the mosaic plot: a vast majority of the venues having more than 40 reviews
have no impact on the long term. This shows that review spikes have a smaller
impact on constantly popular venues.
Conclusions on Yelp Events. On the long term, events do not seem to impact
the ratings of hosting venues. We believe this is because high numbers of regular
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Figure 5.19: SpiDeR output. Zoom-in of Figure 5.11a.
reviews tend to overwhelm the impact of event spikes. However, Yelp events show
a noticeable short term positive impact. Even a short term increase in popularity
may act as a motivation to host such events [AM12].
5.5.3 SpiDeR Evaluation
We implemented SpiDeR in Java. Our implementation pre-loads a compressed ver-
sion of the database of venues in memory, for efficient computation of spikes, avoiding
the I/O overhead incurred by the database engine, e.g. SQLite in our case.
Experimental parameter setup. Figure 5.19 zooms in into several (non-Yelp
event) spikes from Figure 5.11a, showing, for each venue, the spike’s amplitude, the
number of reviewers that have only one review, the number of reviewers that have at
most one friend and the number of out-of-town reviewers. It identifies several other
suspicious spikes and venues (including Yelp’s own venue!), registering between 25-
85% reviewers with 1 review, between 52-90% reviewers with at most one friends
and between 64-100% out-of-town reviewers. Thus, SpiDeR detects the spikes of
these venues even with very low parameter values: Tr = 2, Tf = 2, wr = 0 and
Tp = 0.25.
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Figure 5.20: Distribution of the number of campaigns in which users participated,
including Yelp events.
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Figure 5.21: Distribution of the number of campaigns in which the fake users par-
ticipated.
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Figure 5.22: Distribution of the amplitude of spikes detected by SpiDeR when con-
sidering only Yelp non-filtered reviews and when considering also filtered reviews.
The ground truth. In a first experiment, we evaluate the ability of SpiDeR to
detect users that have participated in multiple review campaigns, using the data
we have collected from the fake reviewers identified and described in Section 5.2.4.
Figure 5.21 shows our results: 45 users are identified as participants in fake cam-
paigns. The reason for not identifying all the fake reviewers is that several users
have written neutral (3-star) reviews, thus were not considered by SpiDeR .
In a second experiment, we compare SpiDeR and Yelp’s filtering mechanisms.
For this, we use the data collected from the 2,718 venues, from which we have also
collected the filtered reviews. First, for each venue, we feed SpiDeR with all the
reviews registered by the venue, including the filtered reviews. Second, for each
venue we run SpiDeR on only the non-filtered reviews. In both runs, we set Tp
= 0.5, Tr = 2 and Tf = 2. That is, SpiDeR only returns spikes that have at
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least 50% reviews written from accounts having at most 2 friends and at most 2
written reviews. Figure 5.22 compares the distribution of the amplitude of the
spikes detected in the two SpiDeR executions. It shows that the reviews filtered by
Yelp belong to 58 spikes of amplitude ranging between 4-10 reviews. Thus, while
Yelp filters reviews based on the number of friends and reviews of their writers, Yelp
is not detecting review campaigns. By discovering clusters of time-clustered reviews
written by low-rated reviewers, SpiDeR complements Yelp’s defense mechanisms.
Repeat campaigners. Figure 5.20 shows the distribution of the number of review
campaigns in which yelpers from our dataset have participated, when considering
also Yelp events. While we expected a long-tail distribution, we note the high num-
ber of participants in review campaigns - over 650, with more than 150 users partic-
ipating in 2 or more campaigns. We emphasize the user with 21 review campaigns,
while 16 users have participated in 5 campaigns for different venues.
5.5.4 Conclusions and Limitations
We were able to detect several hundred review campaigns, that include both (i)
Yelp events that impacted the rating of hosting venues and (ii) malicious behavior
exhibited by other parties, e.g., venue owners or the competition.
Also, we were able to find dependency between Yelp features and long and short
term impact on the venues. Although it is unlikely that for a fake campaign to
impact in the long term, a venue may harness short term impact for quick revenue.
While WatchYT can be bypassed by motivated adversaries, the financial effort
of a successful campaign is increased: campaigners with good reputations need to
be recruited. A good reputation entails having at least 2 active friends and at least
2 written reviews.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter describes the most important conclusions of our work and future re-
search directions.
6.1 Summary
In this dissertation, we have focused on three important problems that arise in lo-
cation based services, including geosocial networks. In order to address the problem
of ensuring data accuracy, we proposed an important geographic database oper-
ator to perform data preprocessing and knowledge discovery using spatio-textual
constraints. Specifically, we defined the SpsJoin operation and implemented our
solution in MapReduce. We have shown that our algorithm harnesses both, textual
and geographic attributes to compute relevant pairs between two datasets. We de-
fined metrics to score importance of geographic objects and we leveraged entropy
definitions to improve the performance of our algorithms. Our ground truth defini-
tion allowed us to evaluate the precision of the join algorithm.
In order to address privacy concerns, we introduced an application to motivate
the use of LBSs and to share sensitive information in a private manner. In particular,
we envisioned a safety awareness LBS that leverage both spatial and nonspatial
data. We have proposed several techniques for evaluating the safety of users based
on their spatial and temporal dimensions in order to motivate participation and
tackled privacy concerns. We implemented our concepts with an application in Safe
Cities. We have shown that data collected by geosocial networks bears relations with
crimes. We have proposed a holistic approach toward evaluating the safety of a user,
that combines the predicted safety of the user’s location with the aggregated safety
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of the people co-located with the user. We proposed iSafe, a privacy preserving
algorithm for computing safety of users at geographic locations. Our Android and
browser plugin implementations showed that our approach is efficient both, in terms
of the computation and the communication overheads.
Finally, to ensure correctness of the data, we explored malicious behavior in
LBSs in the form of fake review campaigns. We collected large amounts of data
and build an algorithm to identify malicious behavior in a review based LBS (e.g.
Yelp). In particular, we have shown that review campaigns in geosocial networks are
possible and inexpensive. We have developed algorithms that enabled us to detect
hundreds of venues targeted by review campaigns as well as hundreds of participating
transgressors, some in as many as 20 campaigns. Through our prototype evaluation,
we prove that our Yelp extension efficiently alerts users when browsing suspicious
venues, even when the venues have hundreds of reviews.
We also have studied the problem of review campaigns organized by Yelp and
involving elite yelpers. We have shown that Yelp events are also effective review
campaigns, collecting good reviews from influential users. We have proposed Spi-
DeR, an approach that identifies positive and negative review spikes in the timelines
of venues. We have introduced WatchYT, an SpiDeR extension and a browser plu-
gin that finds venues that have spikes correlated with events they organized. We
have used venue and event data collected from Yelp to investigate the impact of
Yelp events. We have shown that while a short term positive effect can be seen, in
the long run, the effects of events are normalized by the reviews of regular users.
6.1.1 Future Directions
This research can be extended in the following directions.
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1. From the geospatial databases perspective in LBSs, we believe that Spsjoin
has a promising future. One possible direction is to include semantics simi-
larity in our content similarity function. Our current work does not handle
semantics and this will be a great addition to the overall approach. The use of
ontologies and Latent Semantic Indexing (LSI) is definitively a good research
direction,but there is caveat: the performance of the algorithm can be affected
as semantic computations demand large amounts of data lookups.
2. Another interesting direction is the Fuzzy Spatio-Semantic query (FSS) for
geocoding. The FSS scores objects based on the current location. When
the geocoder transforms a string into coordinates, it will first retrieve the
current position and finds the context in which the query was done. FSS will
return results based on the importance in the current position. For instance, if
someone is in Miami, OH, a query to “Miami” will likely to return objects from
Miami, FL. The FSS identifies the current context and returns corresponding
results, putting Miami, OH objects ranked first.
3. SpsJoin can be extended to handle multiway joins. Although our solution
suggests how it can be done, further research is necessary to define efficient
algorithms. A possible approach leverages parallel computation with Mapre-
duce. It requires clustering using all datasets envolved in the join. Further
research is required to handle heterogeneous datasets and different types of
schemas.
4. Safe cities is also another niche of future research. The possibility of incor-
porating safety information in LBSs opens up new ideas for interesting appli-
cations, such as finding the “safest route”. The safest route tells the user of
the LBS system the directions that she must follow to arrive to a certain lo-
cation. Inspired in the shortest route, found in Google Maps and Terrafly, the
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safest route receives an initial point or source and a destiny. Then, the system
computes the aggregated safety information based on safety footprints that
iSafe users leave in the system and computes the trajectory that maximizes
the safety. This system may also involve safety information from venues and
social networks.
5. Our mechanisms for detection of fake reviews in review based LBSs can be
extended in several directions. We have observed that plagiarism is a common
practice in fake review campaigns. One possible reason is that it is cheaper for
the attacker to copy text from a well-written review in a venue and post it in
another venue. Plagiarism can be detected by computing similarity self-joins
on large datasets of reviews. We have found several users that seem to be
engineered specifically to post fake reviews and to exercise the social network.
If successful, those users may create a connected component, strong enough to
bias the opinion in different venues and also to create long term impact, which
is the ultimate goal of these reviews campaigns. Careful analysis, attacks and
defenses can be a great topic for research in security.
6. Our work can be extended to handle adversary attacks that attempt to increase
the rating of a given venue through a well known attack called ballot stuffing
attack. Another interesting type of attack is the de-anonymization attack. A
possible approach is to use geosocial networks data and use SpsJoin to de-
anonymize a a geosocial network data set. In this case, the approach does
not use the network as its major source of attack, but rather, the spatial and
nonspatial attributes of the data.
7. It would be interesting to apply other machine learning algorithms for classifi-
cation of fake reviews. However, the lack of ground truth is a major problem in
supervised learning. Building such a ground truth is definitively an important
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contribution in solving the problem of fake reviews. In our work, we developed
our own ground truth to evaluate the performance of our solution but it has
flaws that may be fixed by producing a more complete golden dataset that
allows researchers to further experiment in this exciting topic.
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